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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the legal changes to the pre-strike ballot and picketing provisions 
contained in the Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA). Firstly, it seeks to understand the 
provisions as responses to trade unions’ uses of so-called ‘leverage’ tactics, especially 
during the Grangemouth industrial dispute of 2013.1 Secondly, it seeks to understand 
them as the most recent episode in the history of the ‘golden formula’2 for determining 
the lawfulness of industrial action with reference to its purpose of furthering a trade 
dispute.3 The main research question the thesis asks is this: can the TUA, and the 
policy to which it was pursuant, rightly be understood as a response to leverage 
campaigns and what does this imply for industrial action, and labour’s capacity to 
exercise its right to protest? Having traced the development of the provisions of the 
TUA – from the Carr Review4 and the Conservative Party’s 2015 General Election 
manifesto, throughout the consultation and parliamentary processes, to the enacted 
legislation – the thesis then assesses the provisions in the context of the leverage 
campaign strategy and tactics, drawing here on a comparison with similar 
developments in the US. The conclusion is drawn that the TUA should be understood 
as a response to leverage campaigns because it brings unions’ protest activity within 
the scope of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.  A 
comparison of UK and US case law supports the additional conclusion that it is 
increasingly difficult for unions in this country to protest lawfully in the context of a 
trade dispute. 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Dixon, H. (2013). Unite union accused of using bully tactics in Grangemouth dispute. Available: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/10416408/Unite-union-accused-of-using-bully-
tactics-in-Grangemouth-dispute.html. Last accessed 21/09/2019 
2 Wedderburn (1986) ‘The Worker and the Law’ 3rd ed. London Penguin Books p.520-521 
3 TULRCA s219 
4 Bruce Carr QC, ‘The Carr Report: The Report of the Independent Law Governing Industrial Action’ 
(The Carr Review) (October 2014). Available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3638
06/Carr_Review_Report.pdf. (Last accessed 22/09/2019) 
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Introduction  
 
I. Research Questions 
 
In 2013 Len McCluskey, General Secretary of Unite the Union (Unite) and credited 
with the development of leverage campaigning in the UK, asked ‘Can Unions Remain 
Within the Law Any Longer?’5 He did so in response to proposed legislative 
amendments which would render many of the tactics and activities associated with 
leverage campaigns – namely high-profile protest activity – unlawful. Those proposals 
were presented by the Government of the day as a necessary response to the 
development of tactics by unions (described as ‘leverage’) which Unite allegedly 
engaged in during an industrial dispute with Ineos at the Grangemouth petrochemical 
refinery in 2013,6 and which the Government condemned at extreme.7 As such, many 
of the proposed reforms centred around the regulation of tactics, and particularly 
protest activity. Although many of the proposed reforms did not make it onto the 
statute books, the subsequent Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA) introduced the most 
significant changes to the law governing industrial action since the 1980’s, imposing a 
number of additional burdens on unions taking industrial action. The aim of this thesis 
is to provide an answer to Len McCluskey’s question by providing an assessment of 
the provisions of the TUA which relate to undertaking industrial action and focus on 
protests, like those seen in Grangemouth: ‘leverage’. In that assessment I seek to 
understand the legislation first as a response to leverage and protest, and secondly in 
relation to the so-called ‘golden formula’ for determining the lawfulness of industrial 
action by reference to its purpose.  
 
                                                   
5 McCluskey, L. (2015). Can Unions Stay Within the Law Any Longer. Industrial Law Journal. 44 (3), 
439-449 
6 Dixon, H. (2013). n.1. 
7 The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4, [1.6] and UK Government, Cabinet Office Press Office: 
Government review into the law governing industrial disputes (04/04/2014), available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government- review-into-the-law-governing-industrial-disputes 
(last accessed 22/09/2019) 
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Of course, there is nothing new about the attempt to use the law to restrict the right to 
organise and take industrial action in a variety of ways. The Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) contains detailed provisions setting 
out the requirements for lawful industrial action which long pre-date the TUA, and 
have often given rise to interim interdicts8 to restrain industrial action.9 Further, at the 
end of the last century, a Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, boasted that British law 
was the most restrictive on trade unions in the Western world.10 However, what marks 
the TUA out as quite novel in the history of industrial action law, and worthy of 
further research, is its focus on the union tactic of protesting. Whereas, historically, 
the legislation was framed such that courts need not enquire into the nature of trade 
union tactics, provided that they were undertaken in contemplation or furtherance of a 
trade dispute,11 the TUA imposes regulations which, in response to leverage, are likely 
to force the courts to make an assessment of union tactics by seeking to bring the 
tactic of protest within the restrictions of the TULRCA, whatever its purpose.  
 
The TUA has already attracted substantial academic criticism for its lack of 
evidence,12 for simultaneously incentivising leverage protests13 whilst providing 
opportunities for relief in the form of interim interdicts,14 and for being pursuant to an 
increasingly authoritarian political agenda.15 This thesis begins to contribute to the 
existing research by drawing these criticisms together. It engages in an analysis of the 
underlying policy narrative and rhetoric which informed the TUA, and identifies a 
public policy of restraining protest activity by providing opportunities for employers 
to mitigate or restrain protest activity. Much of the academic criticism assumes, 
                                                   
8 Throughout the thesis I will make use of legal terminology relating to Scots Law particularly interim 
interdict and liability in delict. The equivalents in English law are interim injunctions and liability in 
tort.  
9  See: Network Rail; EDF Energy Powerlink Ltd v National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport 
Workers [2009] EWHC 2852 (QB); Milford Haven Port Authority v Unite the Union [2010] EWHC 
501(QB), and British Airways Plc v Unite the Union [2009] EWHC 3541(QB) 
In Dukes, R. (2003). The Right to Strike under UK Law: Something More Than a Slogan? NURMT v 
SERCO, ASLEF v London & Birmingham Railway Ltd. The Industrial Law Journal. 40 (3), 302-311. 
10 UK Government, White Paper, Fairness at Work Cm. 3908 (London 1998)  
11 Express Newspapers v McShane 108 [1979] ICR 210 
12 Dukes, R and Kountouris, N. (2016). Pre-strike Ballots, Picketing and Protest: Banning Industrial 
Action by the Back Door? Industrial Law Journal. 45 (3), 350 
13 Ford M, and Novitz T. (2016). Legislating for Control; The Trade Union Act 2016. Industrial Law 
Journal. 45 (3), 298 
14 Dukes, R and Kountouris, N. n.12, 353 
15 Bogg, A (2016) 45 (3) Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union Act 2016 and the 
Authoritarian State Industrial Law Journal 229-336 
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rightly, that the TUA is a response to leverage. However, it does so on the basis of an 
understanding of leverage simply as a synonym for protests which are associated with 
industrial action,16 without engaging with the features of leverage or the structural 
reasons for its development, and without addressing the question of whether, and if so 
how, the TUA can rightly be understood as a response to its development.  
 
This thesis seeks to add significantly to the existing commentary on the TUA by 
developing an analysis of the Act in the context of leverage campaigning. Part of that 
analysis involves a comparison between leverage campaigning and the US experience 
of regulating so-called ‘comprehensive campaigns.’ That comparison makes two 
valuable contributions relating to understanding leverage, and the judicial 
interpretation of the lawfulness of leverage campaigns. By comparing the 
development of leverage in the UK with comprehensive campaigns in the US, the 
thesis provides an explanation for the development of leverage campaigning which 
demonstrates how particular features of it – namely protest activity – develop out of a 
need for lawful means, which are both effective and not dependent upon compliance 
with a restrictive legal framework. By then comparing the judicial interpretation of 
leverage tactics, including protest activity, in the UK with the same in the US, the 
thesis highlights elements of UK law which mean that protest activity by unions in 
furtherance of trade disputes may today be unlawful.  
 
II. Research Methods  
 
The thesis combines a close reading of the relevant legislation and case law with 
qualitative analysis of the policy documents which preceded the adoption of the 
legislation, additional publications from the Government of the day, and formal, as 
well as, informal statements by Cabinet Ministers. It also reviews existing academic 
commentary on the legislation. In places, it adopts a comparative methodology to 
supplement analysis of UK law with a comparison of UK and US law, directed at 
                                                   
16 Dukes, R and Kountouris, N. n.12, 337 
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allowing for predictions to be made as to how the TUA, and protest activity, is likely 
to be interpreted in the British courts. 
 
The main question which the thesis addresses is Len McCluskey’s: can unions remain 
within the law any longer?17  To address this question, the thesis formulates two 
further research questions. Firstly, how might we define ‘leverage’, and what precisely 
about the concept of ‘leverage’ was the Government responding to when it introduced 
the TUA? Secondly, what are the implications of the TUA for the lawfulness of 
industrial action and protest activity?  
 
In answering these questions, the thesis is organised into four chapters. Each chapter 
assess different features of the narrative surrounding the TUA as it developed, or the 
TUA itself, against the context of an understanding of the strategy of leverage which 
emerges from a comparison with similar developments in the US.  
 
The first chapter establishes that specific political and legal context. It sets out a 
definition of leverage which goes beyond that offered by the media and by the 
Government in the wake of the Grangemouth dispute, where ‘leverage’ arguably 
gained its pejorative connotations. Instead, by comparing leverage with the 
development of comprehensive campaigns in the US, a more strategic definition of 
leverage is identified, one which is intrinsically linked with the pre-existing 
restrictions of the legal framework. It suggests that the use of protest activity, as 
central to leverage campaigns, follows from a need for labour to develop tactics which 
are effective, and lawful – without relying on compliance with a restrictive legal 
framework to be so.  
 
Chapter two provides a detailed assessment of the Government’s initial efforts at 
directing the narrative surrounding leverage: ‘The Carr Report: The Report of the 
                                                   
17 McCluskey, L. n.5, 439-449 
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Independent Law Governing Industrial Action’ (The Carr Review). It demonstrates 
that the Carr Review was designed to affirm a narrative identified during the 
Grangemouth dispute – that leverage is defined by protests during industrial disputes 
and is inherently extreme. It does so, by firstly assessing the Review as it was 
commissioned (in particular the choice of author, and limited terms of reference). It 
goes onto consider Carr’s approach and findings, and how biases evident in the 
commissioned Review are reflected in them – in particular, in the way Carr defers to 
the opinions of ‘contributors’ to the Review to inform the content, even if these 
opinions are not supported by evidence. Finally, it considers the use that was 
subsequently made of the Review and how it informed a particular narrative of 
leverage campaigns and protests by unions. 
 
Chapter three is similarly concerned with the narrative surrounding the TUA. It 
focuses on the policy which underpins it and the extent to which the enacted 
provisions give effect to that policy. It engages in a detailed analysis of the 
Consultations, policy documents and rhetoric of ministers to trace the development of 
provisions, such as the balloting requirements and picketing regulations, which do not 
prima facie regulate protest activity. By tracing their development, the research 
demonstrates how they operate as a response to leverage campaigning in that they are, 
indeed underpinned by an objective of restricting access to protest activity.  
 
Finally, having identified that the TUA responds to the development of leverage 
campaigns by bringing protest activity within the confines of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA), chapter four considers the 
implications of this for lawful industrial action and protest activity. Firstly, it 
considers the likely judicial interpretation of the provisions of the TULRCA, as 
amended by the TUA, to regulate protest activity (namely s229 and s220A to amend 
pre-action balloting provisions, and picketing), and whether they are likely to give rise 
to orders for interim relief. Secondly, it considers the likely judicial treatment of 
protest activity. By comparing UK efforts at regulating protest activity with the US 
experience of litigation over the lawfulness of similar tactics, the research identifies 
features of UK law (other than the TUA) whereby these protests may be unlawful. It 
	 12	
indicates that the judiciary is likely to interpret unions’ protests, like those seen during 
the Grangemouth dispute, to be unlawful either by non-compliance with the amended 
TULRCA or under the common law. This significantly undermines assumptions, 
identified in chapter one, about the lawfulness of protest activity which informed the 
development of the leverage strategy.  
 
Returning then to Len McCluskey’s question: on the basis of the research undertaken, 
it is argued in this thesis that it is likely to be increasingly difficult for unions engaged 
in protest activity to remain within the law. Given that the TUA was pursuant to a 
policy of responding to leverage campaigning by restricting unions’ access to protest 
activity, and gives effect to that policy by bringing protest activity within the 
restrictions of the amended TULRCA, it significantly undermines assumptions about 
the lawfulness of protests in furtherance of a trade dispute. This is reinforced by a 
comparison between UK and US litigation over the lawfulness of the tactic, which 
suggests that specifically leverage protests (understood in terms of protests by unions, 
in furtherance of a trade dispute) may be unlawful under the TUA and, by the judicial 
interpretation of protests, directed at third parties, by unions. Thus, the tactic, 
irrespective of its purpose (arguably even because of its purpose) is increasingly likely 
to be unlawful. 
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1. Chapter 1. Leverage and the Law: Beyond Grangemouth 
 
In 2015 the Conservative Government commissioned the Carr Review, and 
subsequently introduced the Trade Union Bill to Parliament that was later to become 
the Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA). In doing so, it presented itself as responding to a 
new kind of trade union activity or strategy, referred to as ‘leverage campaigning’ in 
the mainstream press. But what was meant by the term ‘leverage’? Where did it have 
its origins?  What were its key features and potential benefits from a trade union point 
of view, or rather what was the Government responding to, particularly in relation to 
the legal system which regulated industrial action (as it was prior to the 2016 
amendments)?  
 
In this chapter, I contextualise the TUA with reference to both the development of 
leverage campaigning and the pre-existing legal framework. I thereby demonstrate 
that there is a connection between a restrictive legal framework and the development 
of leverage as a union strategy, and the campaign tactics associated with it.  This 
argument is supported by an assessment of the US law relating to industrial action – 
the US being the place where ‘comprehensive campaigning’ developed, arguably 
inspiring the modus operandi of ‘leverage’. Developing from a framework which, 
much like the UK, restricts industrial action, comprehensive campaigns were designed 
to exploit protections conferred by the First Amendment.  
 
1.1 The 2013 Industrial Dispute between Ineos and Unite at Grangemouth (The 
Grangemouth Dispute) 
 
The term ‘leverage’ came to prominence in the UK in 2013 when workers at the Ineos 
petrochemical plant in Grangemouth engaged in non-traditional tactics in the course 
of an industrial dispute. Workers were balloted for strike action following the 
suspension of convenor Stephen Deans – who was accused of using Ineos company 
facilities as part of an electoral fraud allegation in the Falkirk constituency by-
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election.18 At the same time, Ineos were consulting on variations to pensions and other 
terms and conditions – this was not the first time Ineos had been in dispute with Unite 
over these terms and conditions.19  
 
Notably the dispute quickly escalated from initially concerning the treatment of 
Stephen Deans, to concerning the financial viability of the plant – managers gave 
interviews suggesting it couldn’t survive without union concessions,20 threatening a 
cold-shut down,21 and writing down the value of assets in the plant to £0.22 The plant 
is not only a significant employer in Scotland,23 but also supplies the majority of fuel 
to Scotland, Northern Ireland and the North of England.24  The importance of the 
political and economic consequences of the closure of Grangemouth is evidenced by 
the then First Minister Alex Salmond’s intervention to attempt to broker a deal, and 
Ineos eventually securing a Government underwritten loan to support the plant.25 
Supporting the plant, however, did not extend to maintaining the terms and conditions 
of employees, and it was suggested that workers “virtually begged for their jobs 
back”26 when they accepted reduced terms and conditions. Described as a ‘plot’27 the 
actions of Ineos - in publicly suggesting the plant was in financial difficulty - were 
suspected as having been designed to force the workers to accept reduced terms and 
conditions under threat of plant closure and therefore job losses. 
 
                                                   
18 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/11/oil-workers-scotland-strike-stephen-deans-unite 
(last accessed 22/09/2019) 
19 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/10398888/Grangemouth-timeline-of-the-
dispute.html (Last accessed 22/09/2019) 
20 Jeff. D. (2013). £300m Survival Plan for Grangemouth. Available: 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/scotland/top-stories/300m-survival-plan-for-grangemouth-1-3118462. 
(Last accessed 20/09/2019.) 
21 Ibid 
22 McCulloch, S. (2013). INEOS writes down £400m of assets at Grangemouth plant to 'nil 
value'. Available at: https://www.insider.co.uk/news/ineos-writes-down-400m-assets-9868168. Last 
accessed 21/09/2019. 
23 Morris, B. (2013). Why Grangemouth matters. Available: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
24624934. (Last accessed 21/09/2019.) 
24 Ibid 
25 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-24671184 (last accessed 22/09/2019) 
26 Seymour, R. (2013). How Ineos humiliated Unite in Grangemouth. Available: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/09/ineos-unite-union-grangemouth-oil-refinery. 
(Last accessed 21/09/2019.) 
27 Lyon, M. (2017). 'The Build-up of the plot', and 'The Execution of the plot beings'. In: Lyon, M. The 
Battle of Grangemouth. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 120-140, and 141-159. 
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In the US, Bronfenbrenner has identified the ‘threat to close’ as a ‘pervasive and 
effective’ method for resisting trade union recognition.28  Bronfenbrenner’s research - 
which includes both the threat to close and actual closure - outlines the subtle, and less 
subtle, ways in which employers threaten the workforce with closure when facing 
union certification. Methods range from appearing to start moving operations 
elsewhere (such as to Mexico in the 1995 recognition campaign at ITT Automotive in 
Michigan)29 to speeches by management which imply an intention to close, depending 
on the result of a union certification election.30 If the developments identified by 
Bronfenbrenner are indicative of a tool for resisting union activities, then the 
Grangemouth dispute may not be the last dispute where the threat to close is exercised 
to gain concessions from the workforce. Neither public nor political concern for this 
largely unregulated and high-risk employer strategy, however, has been the legacy of 
the Grangemouth dispute. Instead, what attracted the attention of the media and 
Government were the tactics engaged in by the Union. Although the planned strike – 
which achieved a mandate of 86% turnout and 90% in favour31 – was eventually 
called off,32 the tactics in which the Union engaged were widely reported in the 
mainstream media and attracted significant Government interest, including the 
commissioning of the Carr Review.33 
 
As the dispute escalated, and in the face of escalating employer tactics, so too did the 
campaign tactics, from traditional tactics – consisting of an over-time ban, and work-
to-rule from 7th October 2013,34 and planned strike action on the 20th October 201335– 
to non-traditional tactics. These included a daylight vigil, in lieu of the called-off 
strike, to “show…unity and resolve” over the treatment of Stephen Deans,36 and 
demonstrations at the plant supported by the Truck Drivers branch of Unite who 
                                                   
28 Bronfenbrenner, K. (1997) ‘We’ll Close! Plant Closings, Plant-Closing Threats, Union Organising 
and NAFTA’ Cornell university Press Special Report. Available at: 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.co.uk/&httpsr
edir=1&article=1018&context=cbpubs (Last Accessed 22/09/2019) 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4, [4.11] 
32 Lyon, M. (2017). The Battle of Grangemouth. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 162 
33The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4, [1.1] 
34 Ibid [4.11] 
35 Ibid. 27-18 
36 Lyon, M n.35 
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“marched across Bo’ness Road lead by bagpipes”.37 What attracted significant media 
attention, and the label of ‘leverage’, were the protests. These protests took place at 
premises associated with Ineos, such as at the  private properties of senior managers, 
and at the premises of companies associated with Ineos, and Ineos management.38 
Those protests featured a range of publicity-generating tactics, including the use of 
flags, banners and the stationing of a large inflatable rat.39 They also allegedly 
included the distribution of leaflets, or as the Daily Mail, amongst others, reported 
‘wanted posters’,40 concerning the Ineos management.41 These tactics were reported in 
a highly emotional manner with the plant managers giving interviews in which one 
claimed to have “feared for the safety of his wife and two young children”42 with 
another claimed his daughter received a ‘wanted poster’.43 Alongside this reporting, 
management gave interviews that questioned the financial viability of the plant.44 
Thus, the media portrayal of the campaign emphasised the extreme elements, inferring 
a connection between the tactics of the industrial action, and the survival of the plant.  
 
As a result of the reporting of the Grangemouth dispute the term ‘leverage’ not only 
came to describe an amalgamation of campaign tactics, including protest activity, it 
was also given a pejorative inference. The Grangemouth dispute should therefore be 
understood as a politically palatable opportunity to intervene in the law governing 
industrial action.  
 
                                                   
37 Lyon, M n.35 
38 The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4, 27-28 
39 Shipman, T and Bentley P. (2013). Terrorised by union bullies: How Labour's Unite paymasters 
intimidated managers and their children in bitter oil refinery battle. Available: 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2480643/Labours-Unite-paymasters-intimidated-managers-
oil-refinery-battle.html. (Last accessed 21/09/2019.) 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid  
42 Ibid, see also Dixon n.1 
43 Ibid 
44 See The Financial Times (6 September 2013) Ineos considers shutting Scottish plant, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08141296-16e0-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html. (Last Accessed: 
20/09/2019), and The Scotsman (1 October 2013) £300 million survival plan for Grangemouth. 
Available at: http://www.scotsman.com/news/scotland/top-stories/300m-survival-plan-for-
grangemouth-1-3118462 (Last Accessed: 20/09/2019) both cited in The Carr Review (October 2014) 
n.4 [4.14] 
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1.2 Understanding Leverage Campaigning  
 
In 2015, two years after Unite’s defeat in the dispute with Ineos, Len McCluskey 
argued that the Conservative Government was seeking to legislate in response to 
leverage to render it unlawful.45 McCluskey is the General Secretary of Unite and has 
been credited with the development of leverage in the UK. If what he claimed is 
correct, then any assessment of the TUA also requires an assessment of what is meant 
by ‘leverage’. By reviewing Unite’s formal definition of leverage, and how it has been 
replicated by other unions, and in other campaigns, it is possible to understand what it 
was about the leverage strategy and tactics, that the Government was responding to.   
 
In a manner which seems to have become generally accepted,46 Unite defines leverage 
as follows:  
“leverage is a process whereby the Union commits resources and time to 
making all interested parties aware of the treatment received by Unite 
members at the hands of the employer…We ask all interested parties to make 
moral and ethical decisions about their future relations with an employer. 
Unite will make sure all are aware of the true facts behind an employers’ poor 
treatment of our members. We will ask those who object to the behaviour of an 
immoral employer to conduct lawful protest against the actions of the 
employer”.47  
 
This definition emphasises the research and resource intensive strategy,48 to identify 
and influence through third parties, which underpins leverage. It emphasises “making 
all interested parties aware of the treatment received by Unite members”,49 and asking 
                                                   
45 McCluskey, L. n.5 
46 http://www.unitetheunion.org/growing-our-union/organising-toolbox/leverage/ last accessed 
20/11/2018, cited in, The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4 [2.10]- [2.11] 
47 Ibid 
48 French. S, and Hodder, A. (2016). Plus Ca Change; The Coalition Government and Trade Unions. In: 
S Williams, P Scott Employment Relations Under Coalition Government; The UK Experience 2010 - 
2015. New York and London: Routledge. 165-185 
49 Unite the Union ‘Leverage’ n.46 
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those interested parties to “make moral and ethical decisions about their future 
relations with an employer”.50 As Len McCluskey stressed, in his Industrial Law 
Society Wedderburn Lecture, the union “fights with research, planning and the 
execution of tactical activity – within a strategy and within the law”,51 directing its 
actions at “interested parties” such as suppliers, financiers, customers and the general 
public. Whereas in the traditional strike the economic harm associated with a 
withdrawal of labour is at stake, Unite’s definition suggests that what is at stake in the 
leverage campaign is the employer’s reputation. This is evident in the directing of 
publicity generating tactics towards key stakeholders, including the general public, 
who may consequently seek to change, or cease doing business with the targeted 
employer.  
 
The Unite definition also indicates the means by which leverage is to be given effect: 
the “lawful protest”. For example, during the 2011-2012 dispute over the withdrawal 
of companies from the joint agreement in the engineering sector (referred to as the 
BESNA dispute in the Carr Review)52 – acknowledged by Unite to have been a 
‘leverage’ campaign53 – large-scale protests took place. Those protests were 
concentrated at the sites of contractors who were considering withdrawing and 
culminated in a ‘day of action’ in November 2011.54 If the employer’s reputation is 
what is at stake, protests are a useful tactic as they widely publicise the dispute both 
directly and indirectly. Directly, the protest activity might take place at the sites of 
those stakeholders, or involve other grassroots activists.55 Indirectly, the activity 
attracts the attention of the media, particularly where the protests feature publicity-
generating props such as; an inflatable rat-shaped balloon – known as ‘Scabby’56 – the 
distribution of leaflets, noisy PA systems, and displaying banners.  French and Hodder 
described these publicity-generating tactics as ‘leverage type’ because they commonly 
feature in leverage campaigns, and have also been adopted by community branches, 
                                                   
50 Ibid 
51 McCluskey, L. n.5, 446 my emphasis.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
52 Referred to the BESNA dispute after the agreement from which members sought to withdraw - the 
Building and Engineering Services National Agreement.  
53 Unite the Union, ‘Leverage’, n.46 
54 The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4, 59 
55 French. S, and Hodder, A. n.48  
56 Lasswell, M. (2019). Justice for Scabby the Rat. Available: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/unions-have-suffered-enough-leave-scabby-the-rat-
alone/2019/09/06/40081276-cff6-11e9-87fa-8501a456c003_story.html. (Last accessed 22/09/2019.) 
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and other unions, to escalate pressure on an employer by targeting its reputation, 
without necessarily forming part of the centralised and resource intensive ‘leverage 
strategy’.57  
 
Arguably, both the leverage strategy, and leverage type tactics have their origins in the 
US, where ‘comprehensive campaigns’ developed.58 In the 1970’s Ray Rodgers – 
organiser for the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union – researched the 
target employer, JP Stevens, and identified relationships, particularly financial, upon 
which the company was dependent. Tactics – such as large-scale demonstrations – 
were then directed at those relationships.59 This comprehensive campaign strategy has 
also been distinguished from traditional methods with reference to its locus, which is 
community based, and not restricted to workers at the targeted workplace. 
Comprehensive campaigns, similarly to leverage campaigns, commonly include a 
broad range of participants (such as activists) and are not restricted to the workers 
party to a dispute. They often also have a more politicised rhetoric.60 Judge Wald 
defined comprehensive campaigns as “negative publicity campaigns aimed at 
reducing the employer’s goodwill with employees, investors, or the general public”.61 
Since then, the strategy has been replicated in a number of high-profile campaigns in 
the US, including the Justice for Janitors campaign,62 and organising efforts of the 
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) at Smithfield’s 
Tar Heel Plant.63 Thus, the comprehensive campaign targets an employer’s reputation 
through publicity-generating tactics that commonly include protest activity.  
 
                                                   
57 Ibid 
58 Sometimes these are referred to as ‘corporate campaigns’ 
59 Jarley, P and Maranto C.L. (1990) Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 34 (5), 505-506, 513 
60 Garden C. (2011). Labour Values and 1st Amendment Values; Why union Comprehensive 
Campaigns are Protected Speech. Fordham Law Review. 79 (6), 2622 
61 Food Lion, Incorporated v United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Afl-Cio-Clc, 
United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc, 103 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Food Lion v UWFCW) 
per Justice Wald, footnote 9.  
62 Walringer R, Wong K, Erikson C, Milkman R, Mitchell D.J.B, Velenzuela A, Keitlin M (1998) 
Helots No More; A Case Study of the Justice for Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles. In Bronfenbrenner 
K, Freidman S, Hurd R.W, Oswald, Seeber R. L. (Eds) ‘Organising to Win: New Research on Union 
Strategies. Ithaca and London. Cornell University Press. 102-119 
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In the UK, similar developments have been evident in the course of what is termed 
‘organising unionism’. Here, collective action acts as a “nucleus for recruitment”.64 
The type of collective action in question resembles comprehensive campaigns as it 
involves “the identification of levers, allies, and pressure points to discourage 
employer opposition…”65 Heery describes that collective action as relying on 
“…planned, organised campaigns in which the union researches the target 
company…and development of community support so that the campaign extends 
beyond the workplace…”66 In ‘organising unionism’, then, there is an emphasis on the 
strategic targeting of an employer’s reputation – much like in both comprehensive and 
‘leverage’ campaigns.  
 
There is also evidence of the leverage type activity, identified by French and Hodder, 
in trade union responses to austerity policies and changing labour markets. Policies 
following the 2008 economic crash included a reduction in public spending – 
including a public sector pay-cap and recruitment freeze – which had a particular 
impact in the public sector.67 As a traditional trade union stronghold, the public sector, 
arguably, became the “battleground for employment policies”,68 as powerful unions 
became increasingly militant in their opposition. For example, the Public Sector and 
Commercial Services Union (PCS) published critical pamphlets, 69 participated in 
widespread industrial action – including a day of ‘co-ordinated action’70 by thirty 
unions71 – and (ultimately unsuccessful) litigation to judicially review changes to the 
public sector pensions schemes.72 Since then smaller, grass-roots or activist-lead trade 
unions73 have developed campaigns which focus around high-profile protest activity. 
                                                   
64 Bronfenbernner. K, and Juravich, T. (1998). It Takes More Than House Calls: Organizing to Win 
with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy. In: Bronfenbrenner, K, Friedman. S, Hurd, R. W, 
Oswald. A, & Seeber. R. L. (Eds.), n.62. 
65Heery. E, Simms. M, Simpson. D, Delbridge. R, Salmon. J. (1999). "Organizing unionism comes to 
the UK". Employee Relations. 22 (1), 40. 
66 Ibid.  
67 French, S. and Hodder, A. n.48, 65-185. 
68 Ibid 
69 Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) (2012) ‘There is an Alternative; the Case against Cuts 
in Public Spending’, and ‘Austerity Isn’t Working; There is an Alternative’ Available at: 
http://www.pcs.org.uk/en/campaigns/campaign-resources/austerity-isnt-working-there-is-an-
alternative.cfm (Last accessed; 09/08/2018) 
70 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15953806 (Last accessed: 20/09/2019) 
71French, S. and Hodder, A. n.48, 165-185. 
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For example, the Independent Workers of Great Britain union (IWGB) have 
effectively used high-profile protest activity to apply pressure to employers and win 
concessions.74 Similarly, pressure groups who are not trade unions but campaign on 
labour issues, have developed and adopted the strategy of generating publicity. For 
example, Better Than Zero75 is a Scottish Trade Union Congress affiliated pressure 
group which has had success in campaigns relating to the use of zero-hour contracts 
and tipping policies. Often these campaigns involve large well-publicised 
demonstrations.76  
 
Despite Unite denying that the leverage strategy was deployed during the 
Grangemouth dispute,77 there too there is some evidence of French and Hodder’s 
‘leverage type activity’. In addition to the protest activity which attracted much of the 
negative press attention, the union engaged in publicity-generating tactics which 
might damage the employer’s credibility and reputation. For example, while 
consulting on changes to the terms and conditions Ineos issued employees with 
consent forms, which union members chose to return to the union, rather than Ineos 
“as a show of collective resistance”.78 Similarly, in the face of the employer’s claims 
relating to the financial insecurity of the plant, the union had Ineos’ accounts 
forensically examined,79 and engaged with chartered accountant Richard Murphy to 
demonstrate that the company’s alleged financial distress necessitating concessions 
from the workforce was misleading.80 
 
It may be, then, that leverage campaigning has its origins in the development of 
comprehensive campaigning in the US. There, the strategy of targeting an employer’s 
                                                   
independe_b_18529226.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvLn
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74 Osborne, H and Butler, S. (2016). Collective action via social media brings hope to gig economy 
workers. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/aug/19/collective-action-via-social-
media-brings-hope-to-gig-economy-workers. (Last accessed 21/09/2019.) 
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77 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24976760 (Last accessed: 20/09/2019) 
78 M Lyon n.35, 162 
79 Ibid, 126 
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reputation through high-profile publicity-generating activities – including protest 
activity – began to develop in the 1970s. There appear to be a number of tactics 
common to both the comprehensive and leverage strategy including: litigation, 
distributing critical leaflets and engaging professional services  and litigation to 
challenge employer’s claims. What they have in common is that they undermine the 
employer’s credibility, publicise the dispute, and are lawful. Whilst the choice of 
campaign tactics will vary depending on what will attract publicity, and most affect 
the employer’s reputation, protest is a consistent feature of comprehensive 
campaigning and leverage alike.   
 
1.3 The Law of Industrial Action  
 
Campaign strategies and tactics do not develop in a vacuum, and the legal framework 
regulating industrial action is likely to have a significant influence over their 
development. The US experience of developing comprehensive campaigns in light of 
the First Amendment is evidence of this. Could it be the case that the development of 
leverage campaigns in the UK has similarly been motivated by the need to develop an 
effective strategy which is not constrained by a restrictive legal framework? A 
comparison between the US experience of regulating comprehensive campaigns, and 
the UK law of industrial action demonstrates that much of the effectiveness of the 
leverage strategy rests on the assumption that it is lawful, and not dependent upon 
compliance with onerous statutory requirements in order to be lawful.  
 
1.3.1 The National Labor Relations Act   
 
In the US, like the UK, the law governing industrial action sets out the parameters 
within which industrial action is lawful. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 
1935 (NLRA) confers a right to “self-organisation, to form, join, or assist labor 
organisations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
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other mutual aid or protection…”81 Collective bargaining is defined as “the duty to 
bargain in good faith”, with the objects of collective bargaining being restricted to 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.82 That right includes a right to 
strike,83 but restricts other tactics short of a strike. It specifically prohibits types of 
picketing,84 secondary action,85 and secondary boycotts in s8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Inserted by 
s158 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 1959 in an attempt to 
close perceived loopholes, s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) renders it an unfair labour practice to 
“threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in commerce, or in an industry 
affecting commerce, where the object is forcing or requiring any person to cease 
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise, dealing in the products of any 
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other 
person”.86 Although some tactics have been protected through the ‘publicity proviso’ 
(National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 
Local 760 (Tree Fruits)),87 for the most part, s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) could render many 
comprehensive campaign tactics unlawful. As a result of litigation arguing that 
s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is unconstitutional, because it renders unlawful speech that is protected 
by the First Amendment, the US law of industrial action has developed in a way 
which protects and incentivises comprehensive campaign tactics. 
 
The First Amendment prevents government from making any law abridging freedom 
of speech, beyond a “substantial government interest, and where that interest is not 
content-neutral.88 Interpreting restrictions on free speech is subject to the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine, whereby the “elementary rule… [is] that every 
reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality”.89 Legislation, the US equivalent of an interdict (known as 
enjoining), and arguably s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) itself may all therefore be unconstitutional if 
                                                   
81 NLRA s7 
82 NLRA s9 
83 NLRA s13 
84 NLRA S8(b)(7) 
85 NLRA S8(b)(4) 
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they restrict freedom of speech.90 Reconciling s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) with the First 
Amendment, in light of non-traditional comprehensive campaign tactics, and in 
accordance with the constitutional avoidance doctrine, has posed a significant 
challenge to the courts.91   
 
 In Thornhill v Alabama (Thornhill)92 Justice Murphy extended the protection of the 
First Amendment to include consumer picketing as a means of disseminating the facts 
of a labour dispute.93 Based on the social role and democratic nature of industrial 
action, Justice Murphy thereby rendered the Alabama statute prohibiting picketing 
unconstitutional. The Thornhill doctrine has since been limited to circumstances of a 
supplier/distributor relationship (NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & 
Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits)) 94 and to instances where only a part of, 
rather than the whole, business is targeted ((NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union) 
(SafeCo)).95 However, in a number of cases the courts have found that comprehensive 
campaign tactics, and arguably even the strategy,96 are protected by the First 
Amendment. Following the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the strategy and tactics 
could not therefore be reached by s8(b)(4)(ii)(B).  
 
There have been some tentative attempts by employers to argue that the strategy is 
unlawful as extortion under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act 
(RICO),97 on the basis that the campaign would continue until a union’s demands are 
accepted.98 However, what the litigation on specific tactics indicates is that if a tactic 
can be likened to protest activity, and distinguished from picketing,99 the protection of 
the First Amendment prevents s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) from reaching the activity.  Thus, 
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activities such as handbilling (distributing flyers),100 the use of banners,101 street 
theatre,102 and the stationing of an inflatable rat-shaped balloon,103 are effectively 
authorised, thereby creating an incentive for their use.   
 
1.3.2 The Golden Formula 
 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the bedrock of the UK framework regulating 
industrial action was the so-called ‘golden formula’.104 The term was originally coined 
by Lord Wedderburn to describe the parameters within which industrial action would 
be lawful.105 By stipulating that actions must be undertaken in contemplation or 
furtherance of the trade dispute,106 it neatly encapsulates the principle that the 
lawfulness of tactics employed in the course of industrial conflict should be decided 
with reference to their purpose of furthering a trade dispute.  
 
The test, “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”, first appeared in the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 (hereafter CPPA). That legislation 
decriminalised industrial action, and later formed the basis of the framework 
established by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 (hereafter TDA). The TDA immunised 
industrial action against liability in delict, provided it was undertaken in 
‘contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.107  This legislative intervention, 
following the recommendations of the 1894 Royal Commission on Labour,108 were 
indicative of a strong commitment on the part of the Liberal Government to collective 
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bargaining, and notably correlated lawfulness with the purpose of the action taken, 
whatever the action should consist of. 
 
That commitment to collective bargaining and to the principle of the golden formula, 
which started with the CPPA and TDA, was also found in later legislation including 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts of 1974 and 1976.109 A similar, initial 
commitment on the part of the judiciary is evident in the case of Crofter Hand Woven 
Harris Tweed Co v Veitch (Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed).110 Therein, the 
‘predominant object’111 of the combiners, of “securing the economic stability of the 
island industry”112 through “a better basis for collective bargaining, and thus directly 
improve wage prospects”113 was held to render the imposition of an embargo lawful. 
Despite the discovery in 1964 of the delict of intimidation, including intimidation by 
threatening breach of contract,114 legislative efforts in the 1960’s and 1970’s largely 
retained a commitment to the statutory principle encapsulated by the golden formula. 
From 1979, however, Conservative and Labour Governments alike imposed additional 
limitations to the scope of lawful industrial action that had more to do with the nature 
of the action and the procedure for authorising it, than its purpose. The relevant law is 
now found in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
(TULRCA).  
 
1.3.3 The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992  
 
A series of incremental reforms undertaken by the Conservative Governments of 
1979-1997, and the Labour Governments of 1997-2010 shaped the framework 
contained in the TULRCA, as it was immediately prior to the coming into force of the 
TUA. The Conservative reforms should be understood as having taken place during a 
period of significant industrial unrest – including the Winter of Discontent (1978-
                                                   
109 Simpson, B. n.105, 466-467 
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1979), the Miner’s Strike (1984-1985), the Wapping Dispute (1989) and the Summer 
of Discontent (1989).115 They should also be understood as pursuant to an economic 
policy which required restructuring of the labour market in the name of increased 
market flexibility, and which interpreted trade unions to be obstructions to that 
policy.116 Arguably, this period, characterised as one of ‘decollectivisation’,117 
represented the abandonment of a public policy of supporting collective bargaining, 
which was not reversed by later Labour Governments. The incremental reforms 
restricted the scope of lawful industrial action in a number of ways not contemplated 
by the 1906 Act. However, many of these restrictions – namely the definition of a 
trade dispute, procedural requirements appended to the golden formula, and regulation 
of specific tactics – are carefully avoided in leverage campaigns, and especially by 
protest activity.  
 
The narrowed definition of a trade dispute, introduced by section 18 of the 1982 
Employment Act, and now contained in s219 TULRCA, confers statutory immunity 
where the industrial action “relates wholly or mainly”118 to a trade dispute.119 
Although the list defining a trade dispute remains unchanged from those set out in 
s29(a)-(g) of the 1974 Act (now contained in TULRCA s244 (a)-(g)), which mirrored 
the objects of collective bargaining, the relationship between the action and the 
dispute was required to be more proximate. 
 
Influenced still by the voluntarist approach, the 1980 Employment Act provided for 
balloting for industrial action if the unions chose to do so.120 It was not until 1984 – 
following the Miner’s strike – that the Trade Union Act of that year introduced 
mandatory secret balloting,121 which required a majority ‘yes’ vote.122 (In 1993, it was 
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provided that the vote must be postal.)123 In addition, the 1984 Act prescribed a 
number of the features of the ballot: that an appropriate question be asked,124 and that 
all those entitled to vote be informed of the results of the ballot – including the 
number of yes and no votes, and spoilt papers – as soon as was reasonably 
practicable.125 These requirements are replicated in sections 226-234 TULRCA, and 
are increasingly determinative of the lawfulness of industrial action. Non-compliance 
with the procedural requirements has given rise to interim interdicts on the grounds 
that technical breaches of the provisions renders the action unable to benefit from 
statutory immunity, and therefore unlawful.126 
 
Since 1875,127 the lawfulness of the tactic of picketing has been dependent not simply 
on its purpose, but also on how it is carried out. Prior to the coming into force of the 
TUA, s220 TULRCA stipulated that in order to be lawful, picketing had to be at the 
“place of work” of the picketers; moreover, according to the Code of Practice on 
Picketing no more than six workers should picket at any one location.128  In a similar 
effort to regulate how a tactic is carried out, the 1980 Employment Act129 largely 
prohibited (with some exceptions) secondary action, and entirely prohibited it under 
the 1990 Employment Act.130 These restrictions continue under the TULRCA,131 and 
in the most recently updated Code of Practice on Picketing. The judicial rhetoric of 
cases since this restriction is in stark contrast to that of the court in Crofter Hand 
Woven Harris Tweed,132 as little attention is paid to the predominant object of the 
combiners.133 Rather, the judges pay significantly more attention to answering 
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whether the means used violate the terms of the legislation:134asking, for example, 
whether the union has engaged in secondary action,135 or picketing.136 
 
As is clear from the above discussion, the restrictions of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s 
developed around the golden formula. The legal framework retained a basic 
commitment to the statutory principle that industrial action taken in furtherance of a 
trade dispute should be lawful. However, a number of onerous procedural 
requirements were added, together with the regulation,137 or prohibition,138 of some 
specific types of action. The resulting framework was significantly more restrictive 
than the 1906 Act envisaged. As such, it created an incentive for unions to develop 
means, like those common to leverage and comprehensive campaigns, of taking action 
which fell outside of the framework governing industrial action, and so did not have to 
comply with its restrictive rules. 
 
1.4 A Human Right to Strike; A Human Right to Protest  
 
In addition to the assumption that protest activity by unions avoids the onerous 
requirements of the TULRCA, might it also be assumed to be a “jealously 
protected”139 right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
Human Rights Act 1998? By reviewing judicial interpretations of the right to strike, 
compared with the right to protest, it is possible to demonstrate that the effect of the 
ECHR on labour rights has been to authorise restrictions on the exercise of the right to 
strike. Since the right to protest is more robustly protected by the ECHR than the right 
to strike, this may act as a further incentive for trade unions to construct their 
collective actions as protest rather than as industrial action, a specifically labour right.  
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In respect of both a right to strike and to protest, two of the rights contained in the 
ECHR may be relevant: Article 10 (conferring the right to freedom of expression), and 
Article 11 (conferring the right to freedom of association). It is now well established 
law that Article 11 includes a right to strike,140 although the question remains 
unanswered whether this is an essential element of protected freedom of 
association.141 It has also been said that there is a “functional synergy”142 between 
Article 10 and Article 11 when people come together in order to express a view.143 
Thus in addition to the right to strike, their combined effect is to create a human right 
to protest,144 interference with which must be justified by reference to Article 10(2) or 
Article 11(2), as prescribed by law, and as proportionate and necessary in a 
democratic society.145  
 
Regarding the human right to protest, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has reiterated that “any demonstration in a public place inevitably causes a certain 
level of disruption to ordinary life, including disruption to traffic, and that it is 
important for public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful 
gathering if the freedom of association is not to be deprived of all substance”.146 In the 
UK the question of consistency of the law governing protest activity with Convention 
Rights has commonly arisen in relation to the criminal law, namely in terms of 
breaches of the peace and contravention of s137 of the Highway Act 1980. In respect 
of the criminal law in Steel v UK147 the court found that although the protests 
physically impeded activities, they constituted expressions of opinion within Article 
10, and so the arrest and detention of Steel interfered with rights under Article 10.148 
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In DPP v Zeigler149 the importance of the Convention Rights was made quite 
explicit150 when the Judge stated that “the lawful exercise of Convention Rights in 
Articles 10 and 11 will mean that the prosecution have failed to prove that the 
defendant’s use of the highway was “unreasonable”. For that reason, the defendant 
will have “lawful excuse” for an obstruction of the highway. It will therefore not be a 
criminal offence.”151 Thus, protest activity in the UK must be considered in light of 
the Convention rights and attracts substantial and far-reaching protection from 
legislation which would restrict the exercise of those rights. 
 
By comparison, in respect of the right to strike, the effect of the Convention Rights 
has tended to be to authorise restrictions. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has 
gradually developed to acknowledge that ‘labour rights’ such as the right to collective 
bargaining,152 and the right to strike153 are protected by Article 11 of the Convention. 
However, when trying to exercise those rights the courts have found that the UK’s 
onerous restrictions on industrial action, including strike action, fall within the wide 
margin of appreciation afforded to the UK.154 In RMT v UK155 the court found that the 
UK’s blanket statutory prohibition of secondary action was a justified and 
proportionate measure within the margin of appreciation for securing the trade union 
freedom conferred by the Convention Rights.156 In that case the court was unwilling to 
determine whether the right to strike formed an “essential element” of the right to 
collective bargaining under Article 11, describing it as an “accessory”157  to it. This 
suggests that legislative restrictions on any trade union activity that could be described 
as “accessory” might be lawfully restricted. Thus, in the labour context, the ‘dramatic 
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implications’158 of Demir and Baykara v Turkey159 and other promising litigation160 
have not entirely been realised161 and have even been retreated on,162 leaving labour’s 
rights severely restricted, and unprotected.  
 
Protest activity during industrial disputes – like that common to leverage 
campaigning, and evident in the 2013 Grangemouth dispute – may be understood to 
fall somewhere between these two concepts. On the one hand it might be interpreted 
as protest activity which attracts substantial protection by the Convention Rights. On 
the other hand, its industrial context might be understood to be reason to characterise 
it as an exercise of freedom of association, in which case the kind of onerous 
restrictions which have been found to be compliant with Convention Rights might 
again be judged acceptable.  
 
The importance of that distinction – between the right to protest and labour rights is 
demonstrated by briefly considering the US litigation concerning comprehensive 
campaigns under the First Amendment where the distinction has been made quite 
explicit. In those cases, a judicial line of reasoning developed which likened 
comprehensive campaign tactics to political protests, and distinguished them from the 
conduct of picketing (associated with labour). For example, in DeBartolo Corp. v. 
Gulf Coast Trades Counc.,(DeBartolo II)163 the handbills were not considered typical 
commercial speech as “they pressed the benefits of unionism to the community and 
the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the 
populace”.164 Similarly the use of banners, rat-shaped balloons and other expressive 
activities have been protected by the First Amendment165 – in the same way as 
symbolic speech of street theatre during abortion protests, and flag burning166 have 
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been constitutionally protected. As such, they attracted a high degree of First 
Amendment protection. 
 
The judicial reasoning of those decisions is explored in greater detail in chapter four, 
however, for the meantime what it suggests is that in international human rights 
instruments economic or social rights do not enjoy the same degree of protection and 
enforceability as social or political rights.167 On the basis of the comparison with the 
US litigation, the protests by unions, described as ‘leverage’, are assumed to be 
protests which should enjoy substantial protection under the ECHR. However, as will 
also be further explored in chapter four, and is indicated by the different treatment of 
the right to protest and the right to strike, that protection is very much contingent upon 
the judicial interpretation of the activity. Whether the protests associated with leverage 
campaigning would be treated as protests (like the US), or as an accessory to the right 
to strike and freedom of association, remains to be litigated. However, given the 
ECtHR’s willingness to authorise restrictions which effectively create an un-
exercisable right to secondary action168 in the UK it does not seem implausible that 
legislative restrictions on leverage protests could fall within the margin of 
appreciation. 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
The legal framework regulating industrial action developed out of a public policy 
endorsement of collective bargaining and the recognition of the restrictions imposed 
upon it by the law of tort or delict. It was originally constructed around the golden 
formula, which encapsulated the statutory principle that the ‘purpose’ of industrial 
action should delineate its lawfulness, or unlawfulness. The nature of the action taken 
should be largely unscrutinised. As the law developed in response to changing social 
and political circumstances, it did so initially around that principle, leaving its essence 
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intact while imposing additional procedural requirements and specific rules relating to 
picketing. 
 
As was evident in the development of comprehensive campaigns in the US, restrictive 
laws can encourage unions to engage in new types of collective action that fall outside 
the scope of those laws. Leverage is not premised on the traditional threat of economic 
harm caused by the withdrawal of labour. Rather, it focuses on the reputation of the 
targeted employer among key stakeholders, by generating substantial publicity and 
public awareness of the dispute, while remaining within the law. A key means of 
achieving this is public protest. Not only is the protest an effective means of 
generating publicity, it is prima facie lawful. This is what Len McCluskey meant 
when he argued that the strategy was both lawful and beyond traditional methods.169 
This is the context, I argue, in which the interventions of the Carr Review, and the 
Trade Union Act 2016, should be assessed. The development of leverage was closely 
linked to the terms of the existing legal framework.  
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2.   Chapter 2. The Carr Review 
 
‘The Carr Report: The Independent Review of the Law Governing Industrial 
Disputes’ (The Carr Review) was commissioned in 2014 to ‘investigate the alleged 
use of extreme tactics in industrial disputes’.170 If the Grangemouth dispute and the 
media reporting thereof created an opportunity for politically acceptable intervention, 
is it possible that the Government then used the Carr Review to shape a narrative that 
would justify the kind of intervention it wished to make? Is there evidence to suggest, 
in other words, that the Government sought to influence the eventual findings of the 
Review in order that it would legitimise future legislative interventions? 
 
In this Chapter, I contextualise the Review in relation to Government policy and 
rhetoric of the time. I argue that the Government intended the Carr Review to reach 
conclusions about the damaging impact of industrial action of a particular type, 
namely protest activity, and to affirm a narrative that characterises such activity as 
extreme. Both the terms of the published Review, and the use made of it by the 
Government, can be seen to reflect the Government’s pre-existing biases. This should 
come as no surprise when we consider the identity of the Government’s choice of 
author for the Review and the terms of his remit.  
 
2.1 In Response to the Grangemouth Dispute 
 
Initially the Government was careful to frame its interest in the Grangemouth dispute 
in terms of its concern for the survival of an important employer and the national 
infrastructure. During a House of Commons debate, the then Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change – Mr Edward Davey – responded to questions concerning 
contingency planning for the closure of the Grangemouth plant. Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of the plant to both the community and the economy, 
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Mr Davey limited the Government’s interest to “encouraging negotiations and making 
contingency plans for job centres and fuel provisions following any closure”.171 
However, once employees had ‘practically begged’ for the rejected deal to be put back 
on the table, as The Guardian reported,172 and Ineos had secured Government-backed 
loans, the dispute reached a conclusion and the rhetoric of the Government shifted. 
Now it inferred a causative link between the union’s conduct and the near-closure of 
the plant, which merited investigation and, impliedly, legislative intervention. 
Speaking in the Commons on 30 October 2013, the then Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, called for a ‘proper inquiry’173 into what happened at Grangemouth, where 
he said a “rogue trade unionist…nearly brought the Scottish petrochemical industry to 
its knees”.174 Francis Maude – then, Paymaster General – defended the call for an 
inquiry on the basis that when protest activity “lapses into intimidation and 
inappropriate activity… the public have a right to know what happened”.175 He cited 
the Grangemouth dispute, arguing that the closure of the plant would have been a 
“terrible penalty” in terms of lost jobs and damage to the national infrastructure.176 In 
this way, the Government gradually shifted its focus onto the conduct of the union, 
rather than the employer, implying a causal connection between the union tactics and 
the near-closure of the refinery.  In the Press Release announcing the Carr Review, the 
Government stated that the “resilience of critical infrastructure” – in which it had a 
“keen interest” – “cannot be guaranteed without effective workforce relationships. 
These relationships, and the law that governs them, have consequences both for the 
operation of particular, critically important, facilities, as well as more widely in the 
economy, at both a local and national level.”177 Rhetoric connecting campaign tactics, 
particularly protest activity, and industrial action with damaging effects therefore 
underpinned the Review from the outset.   
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2.2 The Commissioned Review 
 
The Government had initially envisaged that the Review would be a ‘partnership’ 
project with a panel of three – including representation from the CBI and TUC.178 The 
project would have a broad scope including the underlying causes of industrial 
disputes and the roles of parties therein, including employers, workers and 
government.179 However, in the face of a refusal by the TUC to participate, on the 
grounds that the Review was little more than a political stunt,180 it was eventually 
decided that it should be conducted by a lawyer sitting alone,181 and its remit should 
be narrower. 
 
In selecting who should conduct the review, the Government sought a ‘senior lawyer’ 
from ‘outside government’.182 Given that the Review asked for an assessment of the 
law183 having a lawyer lead it should have lent a measure of credibility both in terms 
of expertise and political neutrality. The Government’s choice of Bruce Carr QC was 
nonetheless controversial.184 It attracted significant criticism from the TUC which 
voiced its suspicion that Carr had been selected in order to give a legal thumbs up185 to 
anti-union policy aims. He stood accused by the TUC of having “made a career out of 
being anti-union”.186 Here, the TUC may have had in mind Carr’s representation of 
the employer in such politically contentious cases as BA v Unite (BA case).187 During 
which he described Unite as depriving “literally millions of a happy Christmas” by 
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organising industrial action by cabin crew.188 In court, he successfully persuaded 
Justice Cox that a strike at that time would be too disruptive189 and therefore merited 
being restrained on an interim basis. The TUC would also have been right to argue 
that there were alternative legal professionals and academics with a similar 
background in industrial disputes and policy work who could have led the review. For 
example, John Hendy QC represented the Union in the BA case190 with similar 
expertise in industrial relations law,191 and having worked on policy proposals such as 
Reconstruction after the Crisis.192  
 
Perhaps any perceived biases in the choice of author might have been overcome by 
sufficiently wide-ranging terms of reference. However, here again there is evidence of 
a bias in the commissioning of the Carr Review. In the Press Release announcing the 
Review, the Government set out the terms of reference, requesting: an assessment of 
the alleged use of extreme tactics in industrial disputes, including so-called leverage 
tactics, and the effectiveness of the existing legal framework to prevent inappropriate 
or intimidatory actions in trade disputes, with recommendations for change.193 While 
the Government commissioned the Review in the aftermath of Grangemouth – which 
formed one of the key areas of interest194 – the terms of reference contemplated an 
investigation that extended far beyond the particularities of that dispute and other 
disputes involving ‘critical infrastructure’.  At the same time, however, they limited 
the purview of the Review very significantly to “extreme” tactics.  A number of 
additional issues were explicitly excluded from the Review: blacklisting, and the 
procedural requirements of industrial action.195 For the TUC, these exclusions 
suggested an inherent bias to the Review as only interested in ‘extreme’ tactics 
employed by trade unions, and not in those of employers.196  
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By referring to “extreme tactics, including co-called leverage tactics”197 the 
Government implied pre-emptively that leverage was “extreme”.  No enquiry need be 
made, they seemed to suggest, as to whether leverage was extreme, had been extreme 
to date, or could be exercised in the future in a manner that was not extreme. 
Similarly, in asking for an assessment of the effectiveness of the law in preventing 
‘extreme tactics, including so-called leverage tactics’, the Government indicated its 
condemnation of leverage and its belief that it should be unlawful. The terms of 
reference also seemed to direct Mr Carr to consider leverage campaigning, as protest 
activity, in isolation, without attempting to analyse or understand the structural 
reasons for its use. As was argued in chapter one, a restrictive legal environment is 
intrinsically linked with the development of leverage. It is telling then, that Mr Carr 
was only tasked with reviewing the use of leverage and the effectiveness of the law in 
terms of preventing “inappropriate or intimidatory”198 tactics. He was not asked to 
consider how or why the unions had begun to use such tactics, nor to consider whether 
the legal framework itself might be part of the problem.  
 
2.3 Carr’s Approach and Findings  
 
Given that the Government’s biases regarding industrial action were built into the 
remit of the commissioned Review, it is perhaps unsurprising that Carr’s approach and 
findings also reflect those biases. Carr’s approach was to separate the two terms of 
reference, seeking firstly to identify the kind, or type of conduct at issue and secondly 
to review the effectiveness of the existing law governing that conduct. Both parts were 
largely informed by the views of individuals, organisations, or their representatives – 
who I refer to as contributors – who had responded to Carr’s call for submissions. Carr 
himself acknowledged a number of problems with obtaining information, ranging 
from trade union’s refusal to participate in what they considered a “political stunt”,199 
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to employers concerned about damaging their own industrial relations.200 Thus those 
contributors, who informed both terms of reference, came from a small pool of willing 
contributors who notably, had been subject to what might be described as ‘leverage 
campaigns”. 
 
Carr interpreted the terms of reference as follows.  Since neither “extreme”, nor 
‘intimidatory’, nor ‘inappropriate’ actions were defined by the Government in its 
terms of reference, Carr relied on the definitions suggested by contributors. In 
assessing the law, he used the terms leverage, extreme and inappropriate or 
intimidatory actions interchangeably. In defining ‘leverage’ or ‘extreme’ tactics, Carr 
turned first to Unite, citing its leverage strategy document and its reference to: 
“targeting all areas of weakness of an employer” and a “… campaign strategy, 
underpinned by the escalation of pressure to create uncertainty”.201 Carr also referred 
to Pinsent Masons’ assertion that a common theme of leverage actions was “an 
attempt to publicly intimidate or humiliate the individual or entity in question in order 
to pressurise the employer to make concessions… due to personal or economic 
consequences of such action.”202 And he referred to the Engineering and Construction 
Industry Association (ECIA) description of ‘leverage’ as seeking to “extend the 
intimidation and disruption to those parties indirectly involved e.g. shareholders, 
suppliers and customers, and seek publicity…to make public the discomfort they are 
causing – in attempts to embarrass and further intimidate…”.203 The definitions cited 
by Carr share a number of common features: they all suggest that leverage is directed 
at suppliers, customers and shareholders, and senior management, and they agree that 
the purpose of leverage is to direct intimidation, disruption and humiliation at those 
parties to gain concessions. 
 
Although Carr offered no definition of ‘leverage’ or extreme, or any specific tactics 
that would be subject to review, he set out early on that “where information was 
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provided where a party believed the tactics used were ‘extreme’, then these should be 
the subject of consideration.”204 In other words, the views of contributors as to what 
should constitute ‘leverage or extreme tactics’ played an important role in determining 
the content of the Review. The contributions that Carr relied on so heavily were made 
in part by companies which had been the target of leverage action, or their legal 
representatives. Ineos has already been mentioned for its involvement in the high-
profile 2013 Grangemouth Dispute. Pinsent Mason’s websites boasts success in 
“advising a major mechanical and engineering contractor in injunction proceedings in 
the High Court, seeking to prevent Unite calling on employees to take industrial 
action… and obtaining an injunction preventing activists from targeting the house of a 
senior executive”.205  
 
In meeting the first term of reference, Carr outlined nine disputes, giving an overview 
of the issue, the chronology of the dispute, and the conduct involved. In meeting the 
second term, he provided an overview both of the law governing the conduct 
identified by the initial review of the disputes, and the views of the contributors as to 
its effectiveness. Both the choice of disputes and Carr’s categorising of ‘extreme’ 
conduct suggest that the Review – perhaps predictably – implied a close connection 
between ‘extreme’ tactics and leverage campaigning, a high-degree of prevalence of 
these tactics in industrial action, and a failure in the legal framework to constrain 
them.  
 
Turning first to the choice of disputes used to assess the use of extreme or leverage 
tactics (the First Term of Reference). This was based both on submissions to the 
Review, and on research undertaken by Carr’s team to identify disputes as including 
‘leverage tactics’.206 The first four – the Ineos dispute at the Grangemouth Chemicals 
Refinery, disputes in London Underground Ltd. Transport for London, Fire and 
Rescue Services Disputes, Cleaners disputes, and the Total Lindsey Oil Refinery 
dispute – were chosen because they received submissions which specifically 
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referenced those disputes. The second four – the BESNA Dispute, London Buses 
disputes, Howdens Joinery dispute and the DP World dispute – were chosen on the 
basis of research, relying primarily on publicly available material, which identified the 
disputes as either official Unite ‘leverage’ campaigns, or as exhibiting ‘leverage-style 
behaviour’.207 Had these disputes been chosen in pursuit of a definition of leverage-
style tactics their inclusion may have been prudent. However, their inclusion was 
pursuant to the first term of reference, which asked for an ‘assessment of the alleged 
use of extreme tactics in industrial disputes’.208 This might have called for a review of 
a range of campaigns, including those in which no ‘extreme’ or ‘leverage’ tactics 
featured, or leverage tactics which were exercised peacefully. By reviewing only those 
nine disputes which might be characterised as including extreme tactics the Carr 
Review both creates an association between leverage campaigns and ‘extreme tactics’, 
and implies that the conduct is common to, or representative of, industrial disputes 
generally. 
 
As part of the second term of reference, Carr extrapolated from the review of disputes, 
eight ‘themes’ of industrial action which were used to structure the assessment of the 
legal framework.209 Within each ‘theme’ the Review first outlined the kind of conduct 
falling within that theme, and then the relevant law in terms of potential sources of 
liability and remedies. Each theme also included an overview of the views of the 
contributors as to the effectiveness of that law. Review of some of these themes, and 
how Carr came to categorise the conduct in this way, indicates a determination to 
suggest that the ability of labour to protest in furtherance of a trade dispute presents a 
gap in the legal framework.  
 
Of course, to some extent these ‘themes’ were limited by the fact that the terms of 
reference asked only about the effectiveness of the law in relation to ‘inappropriate or 
intimidatory’ conduct, and by Carr’s reliance upon the views of the contributors. 
However, while the chronology of the disputes offered by the Review provided some 
context for the escalation into the use of ‘extreme’ tactics, the effect of categorising 
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the conduct as ‘themes’ is to imply a high degree of prevalence, or recurrence, of 
these tactics in industrial disputes. Further, the effect of categorising the conduct and 
using this to structure the opinions as to the effectiveness of the law, suggests that it is 
the ability to engage in any of the ‘themes’ which presents a gap in the legal 
framework. This is particularly problematic given that some of those ‘themes’ 
describe conduct which is lawful, and not obviously extreme.  For example, themes 
two and six – protests organised in furtherance of a trade dispute,210 and trade union 
communication with third parties to try and influence the outcome of a dispute,211 are 
not obviously, in and of themselves, representative of extreme, inappropriate or 
intimidatory conduct. Further, it is not clear how the ability to engage in protests, or 
communicate with third parties, in fact, represents a gap in the law.  
 
Even if conduct Carr described within themes two and six could be accurately 
described as ‘extreme’, the conduct could be better included elsewhere. For example, 
although much of the theme of ‘protests in furtherance of a trade dispute’ concerned 
the location of the protest, the Review also described protests involving large 
numbers, and lasting for long periods of time. This conduct might have been more 
accurately included in the themes of intimidation or harassment of either non-striking 
workers or senior managers.212 By setting protest and trade union communications as 
their own ‘themes’, the Carr Review suggests that it is the ability to engage in protest 
activity and communicate with third parties, which are themselves inherently extreme 
activities, and that this presents a gap in the legal framework.  
 
The description of these categories: ‘protest in furtherance of a trade dispute’ and 
‘trade union communication with third parties’, distinguishes the activities by their 
industrial relations context from similar activities out-with industrial relations. The 
‘protest in furtherance of a trade dispute’ mirrors the language of the golden formula 
in s219 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act. Similarly, theme 
6 relates specifically to trade union communication with third parties213, rather than, 
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for example, communications by political activists. In so doing, the Review seeks to 
differentiate the activity of protesting and communicating in trade disputes from 
protests with a more political subject matter. It thereby implies that the gap in the legal 
framework is the ability of labour, or workers, to protest and, through communication, 
gain the support of third parties.   
 
Carr’s final theme, ‘Alleged use of Extreme Tactics by Employers’, covered only the 
intimidation of trade union representatives and activists in the form of increasing 
workloads (on the basis of submissions from the IWGB)214 and evidence of a member 
being hit by a car during an FBU dispute.215 Given the one-sided nature of the 
evidence it is unsurprising that this theme is quite brief, however it may be more 
interesting for what it excluded. Despite having its origins in the Grangemouth 
dispute, the Review does not consider the actions of Ineos in deploying their power as 
owners as a tactic. The dispute at Grangemouth has been described as an ‘employers 
strike’216 – on the basis of the employer’s claims in the media217 and actions – namely 
writing-down of the stock value to £0,218 and cold-shutting down the plant219 – which 
created uncertainty about the financial viability of the plant. As a result, the risk of 
losing the plant was too great for both the Government and the union. Employees 
returned to work and Ineos secured substantial Government loans. Yet the Carr 
Review did not consider these tactics in any of its eight themes.  
 
Similarly, partially due to the terms of reference, the Carr Review specifically 
excludes some aspects of the law governing industrial action – namely blacklisting, 
and the pre-action ballot or notification requirements. As a result, it does not consider 
the use of interim interdict as a tactic of employers. The interim interdict, or 
injunction, has been identified as a powerful weapon in industrial disputes,220 and the 
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balance of convenience test221 makes it highly likely that an injunction will be granted, 
particularly where the wider public interest is considered – as it was in the BA Case.222 
Even if interdict might be overturned on appeal223 the effectiveness of industrial action 
is often dependent upon the timeliness of the action and maintaining the support of the 
membership. Both of these factors may be impacted by the time and expense of either 
re-balloting or appealing the interdict. The Carr Review only refers to injunctions (the 
English equivalent to interdict) in the context of remedies where workers, or unions, 
engage in the ‘extreme’ conduct, it does not consider them as employer tactics.  
 
 
2.4 Responses to the Review  
 
In light of the ultimately scaled-down nature of the Review, it has been suggested that 
it was a missed opportunity to update the law governing industrial action.224 At the 
same time, however, the Review has been much criticised for reading as little more 
than a series of allegations,225 since it lacked evidence, and relied instead upon 
contributors to frame its scope and content. Carr himself acknowledged the lack of 
evidence,226 in part blaming the TUC and noting that some employers were reluctant 
to participate, concerned by the political nature of the Review and that it might 
damage their own employee relations.227  
 
Some responses to the Review were less concerned by this lack of evidence, and more 
so by how the Review has been used. The TUC condemned it as a ‘political stunt’228 
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to give a ‘legal thumbs up’ to anti-union policy in advance of a general election.229 
Certainly, one of the reasons cited by Carr for failing to fully deliver against the terms 
of reference, was the increasingly politicised environment in which he worked.230 The 
publication of the Review’s findings was pre-empted by a series of policy 
announcements231 on the future of trade union law. Seemingly unconcerned by the 
Review’s lack of evidence, the Government used it to support both their version of the 
problem of leverage, or what it called “wider protests”,232 and their proposed 
solutions. When consulting on the Trade Union Bill, the Carr Review was treated as 
evidence233 that industrial action often involves extreme, intimidatory tactics, with the 
potential to damage the economy,234 from which the public (who are distinguished as 
‘non-striking workers’),235 should be protected.236 Similarly, the Review was used to 
justify proposed measures, ranging from requiring a picket supervisor,237 to a 
requirement to publicise plans for industrial action, including protest activity.238 As 
the Carr Review did not offer any recommendations for reform the Government was 
able to selectively apply its findings as though it were evidence to legitimise a 
perceived problem in industrial action and justify proposed solutions. For example, 
ACPO’s submissions, despite their response that the law was ‘generally effective”239 
were used to justify the introduction of, amongst others, the picketing supervisor.240 
All this without properly acknowledging the lack of evidence which Carr had been 
careful to explain early on in the Review.241 
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While the Carr Review may have been a missed opportunity to gather evidence and 
put forward sensible proposals for reform, it certainly proved itself valuable to the 
Government. It was used to legitimise the Government’s interpretation of a perceived 
problem, and justify a range of measures despite the lack of either recommendations 
to that effect, or supporting evidence. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The high-profile Grangemouth dispute brought the term ‘leverage’ to prominence as a 
description of the trade union’s tactics. The presentation of those tactics in the media, 
and by the Government, provided an opportunity for politically palatable intervention 
to impose further restrictions on industrial action. It did so on the grounds that 
industrial action involves the use of extreme, damaging tactics, which represents a gap 
in the legal framework. That intervention started with the commissioning of the Carr 
Review to continue to direct the narrative which had surrounded the union’s tactics 
during the Grangemouth dispute.  
 
The full title of Carr’s review – ‘The Carr Report: The Independent Review of the 
Law Governing Industrial Disputes’– then, seems somewhat insincere: for being 
neither independent, nor really a review of the law governing industrial disputes. 
Neither Bruce Carr, nor the contributors to whom he deferred, can be regarded as 
‘independent’. And the review which the Government requested appears to concern 
only very limited forms of industrial action – characterised as ‘leverage’ and 
‘extreme’ – and excluded much of the law of industrial action.  
 
While it might be unfair to describe the findings of the Carr Review as a foregone 
conclusion, it is fair to say, I think, that they were unsurprising. The Government’s 
choice of author and terms of reference suggest that the Review was designed to 
demonstrate the argument that industrial action is increasingly extreme and disruptive. 
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Bruce Carr QC had already tested that argument in court,242 and the terms of reference 
were limited to extreme tactics. In part as a result of these limited terms of reference, 
and partially as a result of Carr’s reliance on the views of contributors to define the 
parameters of the Review, its content was similarly limited, and suggested a 
prevalence of extreme tactics in industrial action. It further suggested that particular 
tactics are extreme by virtue of their industrial context.  
 
The suggestion, in other words, was that the ability of organised labour to engage in 
tactics, like protests activity, represented a gap in the legal framework. Thus, the 
Review presented a disruptive and damaging version of industrial action, which, 
arguably, mirrored the Government’s view. It was then used in turn by the 
Government to legitimise their legislative interventions and justify them as solutions 
to the problem they presented as one of leverage and other extreme union tactics.   
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3. Chapter 3. The Trade Union Act 2016: Leverage, Law and Policy  
 
Leverage campaigning, and the use of protest activity as a key component of it, 
developed by reason of a restrictive legal framework and a severely limited right to 
strike. The assumption of those participating in leverage was that the activity involved 
was prima facie lawful without any need to have recourse to the statutory immunities 
provided for in the TULRCA.  In the Carr Review, and accompanying Government 
rhetoric, the Government appears to have presented this as a gap in the legal 
framework. The Government’s response, I argue here, was to seek to legislate to bring 
that protest activity within the purview of the TULRCA, and thereby restrict labour’s 
right to peaceful protest. 
 
This chapter is concerned with the policy agenda underpinning the TUA – and with 
the terms of the Act itself. The first two parts of the chapter concern policy. There, I 
firstly consider the traditional ideology of the Conservative Government in their 
treatment of trade unionism and industrial action. Secondly, I consider the specific 
policy objectives of the TUA, addressing the question here of how far the traditional 
ideology is reflected in those objectives. In the second half of this chapter, I consider 
the enacted provisions and assess them against the policy aims of the Government. I 
thereby demonstrate that the TUA was designed to restrict the capacity of organised 
labour to use protest activity in industrial disputes by subjecting it to the onerous 
restrictions of the TULRCA.  
 
3.1 Conservative Ideology 
 
According to Davies and Freedland, Conservative policy from 1979-1997 was 
implemented in a series of initiatives with the cumulative effect243 of, amongst others, 
the reduction of trade union power.244  This involved the reversal of corporatism, or 
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removal of trade unions from the corridors of power,245 the empowering of employers 
to resist trade unions246 – by providing sanctions against trade unions, and attacks on 
expressions of solidarity.247  
 
Academic commentary on labour legislation and public policy since 2010 suggests 
that there is a great deal of consistency between the reforms of 1979-1997 and those 
enacted by the Cameron and May Governments. In respect of economic, neo-liberal, 
policies Hepple described the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition (2010-2015) 
reforms as “back to the future”.248 Citing Wedderburn’s critique of the legislation of 
the 1980s, Hepple emphasised the extent to which the Coalition Government had 
relied on ‘evidence’ which was much more anecdotal.249 A similar critique could 
arguably be levied at the Government’s selective use of the Carr Review – which itself 
was distinctly anecdotal for its reliance on submissions of contributors.  
 
It is similarly true that many of the justifications for the reforms to employment law 
during the 1980’s are re-stated in the themes of ‘fairness’ and ‘democracy’ which 
were advanced by the Government to justify the TUA.250 Further, one of the “unique 
capacities” of the state is the narration of an authoritative interpretation of an 
industrial relations crisis”.251 The creation of a sense of crisis around leverage evident 
in the Government’s response to the Grangemouth dispute, and commissioning of the 
Carr Review252 could be likened to reactions to the high-profile industrial action 
which dominated the 1980’s.253 Arguably, this anti-trade union, and an anti-collective 
industrial action rhetoric underpinning the reforms of the 1980’s, is similarly evident 
in the policy documents that preceded the TUA.  
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For example, in 2015, prior to the commissioning of the Carr Review, the right-wing 
Think Tank, ‘Policy Exchange’ published a research note entitled ‘Modernising 
Industrial Relations’.254 It made a number of recommendations for reform to address 
the perceived “…shift in the balance of power to unions”.255 The paper identified this 
shift in: the simple-majority voting system,256 the broadening ‘agenda’ of industrial 
action257 – such as recruitment, funding and collective bargaining258 – and that the 
means of industrial action are changing, citing ‘Unions initiating new types of legal 
action’.259 Although not termed as such, the research paper has arguably therein 
identified the development of leverage campaigning.  
 
This perception of increasing union power is also reflected in an anti-union, or anti-
strike rhetoric narrative evident in both the political sphere and the mainstream media.  
This narrative generally suggests that either; powerful trade unions, and their leaders, 
bully members into taking industrial action for political ends, or striking workers, and 
their leaders, are inconsiderate of the public affected by their industrial action. For 
example, one of the MPs, calling for anti-strike laws was Boris Johnson who, writing 
in 2010, argued that “there should be a law against the Tube strike militants wrecking 
your lives”.260 Similarly, an article in The Express described the union leaders 
involved in the Southern Rail strikes as “swaggering union bully boys who must be 
brought to heel”, and called for the removal of the statutory immunity.261 Following 
the alternative narrative, in another article in The Express, Theresa May’s 
spokesperson condemned strikes by Southern Rail, Royal Mail and BA in 2016 as 
having in common a “shared contempt for ordinary people trying to go about their 
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daily lives”.262 This differentiating between workers and consumers, or non-striking 
workers as the Government referred to them263, seeks to drive a ‘civic wedge’264 
between them and thereby suppress powerful coalitions of interest,265 and to reduce 
the solidarity amongst them, which is often evident in leverage campaigns.  
 
The Conservative ideology of the 1980’s – which, in its fundamental opposition to 
trade unionism, sought to restrict trade unions access to collective action – is also 
evident in the rhetoric of the Government which introduced the TUA. The 
Conservative Government in 2015 similarly characterised industrial action as 
dangerous and disruptive. However, taking the themes identified by Davies and 
Freedland as a starting point, Bogg goes further suggesting that the reforms of the 
TUA present a “much more authoritarian form of Conservatism”,266 in the TUA’s 
broader determination to “stifle dissent”,267 and solidarity amongst striking workers 
and consumers.268 I argue that much like their predecessors in the 1980’s that policy 
objective, given effect by provisions of the TUA, is to attack expressions of solidarity, 
and empower employers to resist those expressions by restricting labour’s access to, 
and the effectiveness of their, protests in industrial action.  
 
3.2 Specific Policy Objectives 
 
When the then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Sajid Javid MP, 
introduced the  Trade Union Bill to the House of Commons, he described it as 
follows: “simply the latest stage in the long journey of modernisation and reform 
[which would]…put power back in the hands of the mass membership, bring much-
needed sunlight to dark corners of the movement, and protect the rights of everyone in 
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this country – those who are union members… and those hard-working men and 
women who are hit hardest by industrial action”.269 This introduction neatly 
summarises the ‘fairness’ and ‘democracy’ justifications advanced by the 
Government.270 By reviewing the policy documents which informed the Bill, 
however, including the specific policy objectives outlined in two Consultations, 
Parliamentary debates, and other influential think tank policy work, I argue in this part 
of the chapter that there was a public policy of restricting the trade unions industrial 
power, by restricting the ability of labour to protest.  
 
The 2015 Conservative Manifesto, consistent with the anti-union, anti-strike, and 
dissent stifling rhetoric, put forward a number of proposed reforms to “protect you 
from disruptive, undemocratic industrial action”.271 Further proposals were made in 
two Consultations; ‘Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers’,272 and ‘Ballot 
Thresholds in Important Public Services’.273 In ‘Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking 
Workers’, the Government outlined its version of the problem in relation to picketing 
and protest activity. In respect of picketing, the Government emphasised the use of 
intimidating behaviour, including aggressive language, approaching and following 
individuals, and evidence of assault of individuals not participating in the picket 
line.274 It also suggested that this was not limited to the physical picket line as photos 
of individuals crossing the picket line were posted online as a form of “public 
shaming”.275 The Consultation also identified ‘wider protests’, defined as “new forms 
of protest” used to “further industrial disputes” which are outside the scope of the 
TULRCA,276 as a key area of risk of intimidation. Heavily influenced by the Policy 
Exchange research note ‘Modernising Industrial Relations’,277  the Consultation on 
‘Balloting Thresholds in Important Public Services’ argued that the disruptive nature 
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of industrial action necessitated a stronger and clearer mandate than was provided by 
the simple-majority system of the TULRCA prior to 2016.278 
 
Turning first to the perceived problem of intimidation or harassment of non-striking 
workers, the Government proposed reforms to the law governing picketing, and 
reforms to regulate ‘wider protests’. In relation to the picket line, the Consultation 
proposed the creation of the role of picket supervisor. It also proposed that the role-
holder should be a trade union official, member, and/or familiar with the Code of 
Practice on Picketing (The Code of Practice), readily identifiable by wearing an 
armband or bandage, and should be issued with a letter of authorisation to be shown to 
police, and employers on demand.279 It was further proposed that all picketing 
participants should similarly be subject to identification requirements,280 and that a 
new criminal offence of intimidation on the picket line should be created.281 In 
addressing the ‘wider protests’, or “protests related to picketing”,282 the proposals for 
reform included a requirement that unions notify the employer, police and certification 
officer of their intended tactics.283 That notification would be in the form of a 
document detailing where and when a protest might take place,284 and confirming that 
members had been informed of the strategy.285 The proposed notification would also 
include whether banners and social media would be used.286  
 
In the Consultation the Government acknowledged that none of these proposed 
reforms could ensure intimidation would not occur, but maintained that they would 
ensure more effective policing and encourage responsible picketing.287 In my opinion, 
however, they are better understood as having been directed at the ability of labour to 
protest. For example, the role of the picket supervisor – without whom the picketing 
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would be unlawful –  is likely to cause practical problems of finding and, or training, 
volunteers who are sufficiently familiar with the Code of Practice, and willing to 
provide details in the letter.288 These concerns would be exacerbated if all individuals 
were subject to identification requirements and it would likely discourage individuals 
from participating.289 Given that criminal activity on picket lines is already regulated 
by the criminal law, it is unclear how a new offence would be better placed to restrain 
criminal conduct. Rather, it is designed to create a risk of criminal prosecution and 
thus a disincentive to picket. The publication of plans is unlikely to have any effect on 
conduct, but is likely to afford considerable opportunity for employers to mitigate the 
effects of industrial action. By being aware of the strategy, they would have 
opportunity to take practical operational measures to mitigate its effectiveness, or 
apply for an interim interdict to restrain it. Thus, there is a mismatch between the 
problems asserted by the Government – namely conduct in the form of intimidation 
and harassment – and the proposed solutions. Those solutions have little impact on 
intimidation whilst discouraging participation in industrial action, mitigating the 
effectiveness of it, and providing opportunities for employers to prevent it all together.  
 
Turning secondly to the perceived problem of weak ballot mandates, there, a similar 
mismatch is apparent in the proposals contained in ‘Ballot Thresholds in Important 
Public Services’.290 Lifting text almost directly from the ‘Modernising Industrial 
Relations’291 research note, the 2015 Conservative Manifesto committed the 
Government to the introduction of ballot turnout thresholds for industrial action,292 
and an additional 40% in favour requirement where that action concerned “essential 
public services”.293 The Consultation suggested the need for the additional threshold 
in the following sectors: health, fire, education, transport services, boarder security 
and nuclear decommissioning. Notably, these were described in the Consultation as 
“important public services”,294 rather than the ‘essential services’, to which the 
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Manifesto referred, and recognised by international law.295 The choice of these sectors 
was justified on the basis that industrial action in these sectors has a disruptive impact 
on the daily lives of people not connected with the strike, and on the economy. The 
‘disruptive effect on daily lives’ argument was particularly important in justifying the 
extension of the thresholds to both the education and transport sectors. The 
Government argued that “strike action which closes schools can create significant 
inconvenience, and sometimes a financial burden, for parents who need to look after 
their child and are consequently unable to go to work…”296 Similarly, it was argued 
that industrial action in the education and transport sectors causes an “economic 
burden and knock-on effects for business continuity planning for those workplaces 
whose staff cannot get to work”.297 Further, concern for commuters, people travelling 
for business, and supply chains”298 justified the inclusion of transport and education in 
the list of sectors to be subject to the additional 40% threshold. On that basis the 
Government argued “it is only fair to ask unions to ensure they have a strong mandate 
from their members before strikes go ahead”.299 
 
A strong mandate, according to the Government, is a “clear, positive, decision based 
on a ballot in which at least half the workforce has voted”.300 The Manifesto also 
contained a commitment to ensuring that “strikes cannot be called on the ballots 
conducted years before”.301 In pursuit of this clear, strong, current mandate the 
Government put forward two proposals. Firstly, it proposed the promised balloting 
thresholds. Secondly, in line with the argument contained in Modernising Industrial 
Relations, that employees should know what they’re voting for,302 it proposed a 
requirement that the union publicise its plans.303   
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The balloting thresholds and publication of plans proposals fail to appreciate the 
democratic nature of trade unions and the existence of statutory rules to prevent union 
leaders disciplining members who do not act in accordance with the union’s 
instructions.304 Similarly, they do not meet the stated democratic aim of an improved 
mandate. This was highlighted in Parliament when numerous MPs raised the 
inconsistency between the Government’s arguments – that ballot thresholds were 
designed to improve voter turnout – whilst initially refusing to entertain electronic 
voting methods, which could achieve this aim.305 The actual effect of the balloting 
thresholds is to restrict opportunities for any industrial action by making a vote in 
favour more difficult to achieve.306 And the actual effect of the publication of plans 
would be to provide employers with the information and opportunity to restrain or 
mitigate the action.  
 
The perceived need to reduce trade union power has been evident in Conservative 
ideology since the reforms of the 1980’s. Its ongoing influence is clear in the research 
note ‘Modernising Industrial Relations’307 and was reflected in the proposals of the 
two Consultations – some of which closely mirrored the proposals of the research 
note. Despite asserting that the proposals sought to improve the fairness and 
democracy of industrial action, by addressing the perceived problems of intimidatory 
behaviour in protests and disruptive industrial action taking place without a 
sufficiently strong mandate, the proposed reforms are not consistent with these aims. 
Rather, much like the 1980’s efforts at attacking expressions of solidarity and 
empowering employers to resist trade unions, the reforms proposed by the 
Government in 2015, would impose procedural burdens and create practical problems 
designed to prevent industrial action. They do so either by discouraging participation 
or by making it harder to authorise, irrespective of the conduct. In short, the proposals 
suggest that it is the opportunity to engage in industrial action and the capacity of 
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labour to protest which is of concern to the Government rather than the stated aims of 
improving fairness and democracy. As such the proposals should be seen as efforts at 
subjecting protest activity to greater regulation, and thereby preventing and, or, 
mitigating the effectiveness of this expression of solidarity. 
 
3.3 The Trade Union Act 2016 
 
Despite Sajid Javid’s claim that the public had voted for the Trade Union Bill by 
virtue of the Conservative Government’s 2015 electoral victory,308 with the exception 
of the Balloting thresholds, the Conservative Manifesto of that year contained very 
little detail on the means by which they intended to “protect you from industrial 
action”.309 If the TUA contains those means, it notably does not contain many of the 
proposals consulted upon,310 and instead consists of provisions which were neither 
Manifesto commitments, nor specifically consulted upon. It is therefore useful to 
consider the enacted provisions in some detail.  Although justified by a need for 
‘fairness’ and ‘democracy’, by assessing the relevant provisions it is clear that the 
enacted provisions are designed to give effect to the underlying policy of reducing 
trade union power by reducing their capacity to engage in industrial action, and more 
specifically, the leverage tactic of protests.  
 
3.3.1 Relevant Provisions 
 
Sections 2 and 3 of the TUA amend section 226 of the TULRCA to require that a 
lawful ballot must have achieved a turnout of 50% of those entitled to vote.311 Further, 
where the action relates to those normally engaged in the provisions ‘important public 
                                                   
308 HC Hansard 14/9/2015 Vol 599 S Javid Col 761 
309Conservative Party Manifesto (2015) n.236, 18 
310 BIS Government Response to Consultation on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services n.278 
and Department for Business Energy and Skills (BIS) The Trade Union Bill: Government Response to 
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services’ the vote in favour by those entitled to vote must be 40%.312 Although 
initially the Government proposed that this should apply to all employees in these 
sectors, including ancillary workers,313 following the consultation process the section 
was amended to apply only to those normally engaged in the provision of those 
important public services, and not ancillary to it.314 Sections 6 and 7 amend the 
notification requirements to take account of this.315  
 
Section 5 amends the requirements of the ballot paper, which, in addition to the pre-
existing requirements, is also required to include three pieces of information; a 
summary of the dispute,316 the type, or types, of action to be undertaken,317 and the 
period, or periods, during which that action is expected to take place.318 Although 
initially the Bill required a “reasonably detailed indication”319 of the matters at issue, 
this was amended to require only a summary320, leaving the other two requirements 
intact. Arguably these amendments bear a strong resemblance to the proposal to 
require publication of plans, albeit with less extensive, specific requirements.  
 
Section 8 increases the notification for industrial action to 14 days. Finally, s234A, 
amended by s9 TUA, leaves the mandate for industrial action valid for 6 months, 
although this was amended by the House of Lords to allow unions and employers to 
agree otherwise without exceeding nine months.321 Any action after that period would 
require another ballot.  Although not expressly assessed in this thesis these 
amendments are particularly important when read in conjunction with the section 5 
amendments, given that their effect is to severely restrict the time during which a 
union can be said to have lawfully taken action. It has been suggested that this might 
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have the effect of discouraging union’s from negotiating as their opportunities for 
action are reduced with every day.322  
 
Despite the wide-ranging proposal relating to picketing and protest activity in the 
Consultation on ‘Tackling Intimidation’, only the picket supervisor role, and its 
associated obligations, formed part of the enacted TUA. The enacted provision 
creating that role largely replicated the Consultation proposals, with the minor 
alterations to remove the obligation to wear an armband or badge (although retaining 
an obligation to wear something to make herself readily identifiable)323 and the 
obligation to show the letter of authorisation to the Police.324  
 
3.3.2 Assessment of the Provisions 
 
Prima facie the pre-industrial action provisions introduced by the TUA do not 
specifically discriminate in respect of any ‘type’ of industrial action planned – other 
than perhaps picketing. Similarly, the specific proposals relating to “wider protests”325 
were not included in the TUA – this might suggest that the provisions were not 
motivated by a concern to restrict protests and that the TUA should not be understood 
as a response to the development of leverage campaigning and use of protest activity. 
However, such a conclusion would fail to appreciate the background to the provisions 
(outlined in the previous section and reinforced in the forthcoming analysis) and 
assumes that the provisions are pursuant to their stated aims. In fact, an assessment of 
the relevant provisions reveals that not only do the provisions fail to achieve their 
stated ‘fairness’ or ‘democratic’ aims, but it also demonstrates that they are designed 
to restrict the undertaking of industrial action, and particularly the use of protest 
activity.  
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Subjecting all industrial action to a ballot threshold is likely to restrict the capacity of 
organised labour to engage in any industrial action.326 However, the additional turnout 
requirement for important public services is focused on restricting industrial action in 
six specific sectors. The choice of sectors has been noted for deviating from the 
“essential services”327 which were included in the 2015 Manifesto pledge, to the more 
broadly defined “important public services”,328 but it is also notable for the association 
of these sectors with high-profile industrial action.  
 
For example, disputes in the fire services and transport sectors were cited by the Carr 
Review as including examples of ‘extreme tactics’ in industrial disputes.329 Recent 
instances of high-profile, disruptive, industrial action were used as evidence of the 
need to intervene in these sectors as the Bill was scrutinised. In the second reading of 
the Trade Union Bill in the House of Lords Baroness Neville-Rolfe outlined the 
rationale behind the Bill arguing that “… It is not fair that a strike in the education 
sector in 2014 organised by the National Union of Teachers was held on the support 
of just 22% of its members. Similarly, in 2014 a strike among NHS workers was 
called by Unite on the basis of the support of just 12% of members”330. In a similar 
argument, responding to a suggestion that employers were not interested in the Bill, 
the Conservative Peer Lord Dobbs asked whether “he [Lord Monks] had ridden on the 
London Tube recently during one of the endless strikes”331 – suggesting that the 
industrial action by workers for the London Underground necessitated the legislation. 
Given that the balloting constituency has already been the subject of substantial 
litigation,332 resulting in interim interdicts to restrain it, it is likely that establishing the 
balloting constituency in these sectors, and complying with notification requirements, 
will be made more complex as a result of the TUA.  
                                                   
326 Creighton, B et al. n. 306, 54-55 
327 Conservative Party Manifesto (2015) n.236, 18 
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It has been suggested that unions might seek to draw constituencies to avoid the 
additional threshold by suggesting that they are not normally engaged in the provision 
of important public services, or that they are ancillary to that provision. 333 However, if 
unions were to seek to categorise workers in this way, they would be restricted by 
litigation such as EDF Energy v NURMT334 which requires detailed categories of job 
descriptions to allow the employer to “readily to deduce…the total number, categories 
and workplaces of the employees concerned”.335 Whilst these provisions should be 
read in light of the RMT v Serco336 judgement – which requires that the information be 
as accurate as was reasonably practicable given the information in possession of the 
union at the time337 – equally they should be read in conjunction with the introduction 
of compulsory membership records,338 and guidance for compliance issued by the 
Government.339 The guidance clearly highlights that it is “for a union to consider the 
practical application of the legislative requirements…”340 and reiterates, what was 
suggested by Justice Blake in EDF Energy v NURMT341: that the purpose of the 
information requirements is to allow the employer to readily deduce the categories and 
numbers of employees involved.342 This may suggest an expectation of increased 
accuracy when categorising workers and affording entitlement to vote. Employers 
seeking to have industrial action restrained may argue that the union failed to 
accurately afford entitlement to vote, and subsequently failed to accurately inform the 
employer of affected workers where the 40% threshold should have applied. It is 
therefore likely that this provision will afford opportunities for litigation, and interim 
relief. Notably, these opportunities, exist in sectors, such as education and transport, 
which are closely associated with powerful unions and high-profile, disruptive, 
                                                   
333 Bogg, A. n.15 
334 EDF Energy v NURMT [2009] EWHC 2852 (QB)  
335 TULRCA ss226A (2C)  
336 RMT v Serco [2011] EWCA Civ 226 
337 [2011] EWCA Civ 226, [75] 
338 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 
ss40-43 inserting ss24ZA-24C TULRCA. See also Ford, M and Novitz, T n.13, 6 
339Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Important Public Services 
Regulations 2017; Guidance on the Regulations Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5835
82/Annex_A_Draft_40__guidance.pdf (January 2017) [14] (Last Accessed 22/09/2019) 
340 Ibid 
341 [2009] EWHC 2852 (QB) 
342 Ibid [13] 
	 63	
industrial action. This suggests that the provisions are intended to restrict industrial 
action, and protest activity.  
 
Arguably, the amendments to the voting paper, amount to a re-stating, or re-working, 
of the proposal to require unions to publish their plans.343 Under the TUA the ballot 
paper, which the employer has sight of in advance of the ballot,344 is required to 
contain information relating to the tactics – namely a summary of the issue, or 
issues,345 the types of action to be specified,346 and the dates it is expected to take 
place.347 Under the TUA the employer is also to receive 14 days notice (or 7 if agreed) 
of any industrial action.348 Meaning that the employer will be aware of the union’s 
tactics considerably in advance of any action.349 It should therefore be subject to many 
of the same criticisms as the publication of plans proposal: particularly, that it affords 
employers the opportunity to mitigate the undertaking, and effectiveness, of the action 
by virtue of that prior notice. Both the research note ‘Modernising Industrial 
Relations’ and the Consultation suggested that the proposal to require the publication 
of plans might increase democratic accountability. However, it was noted during the 
House of Lords debate this it would likely “confuse membership more” and make it 
harder to settle disputes if members did not feel that all350 of the stated issues had been 
resolved.351  This, it was suggested in the House of Lords, makes the amendments to 
the voting papers a “recipe for litigation”.352 It is more likely that this section was 
intended to make industrial action more difficult and less effective by providing the 
employer with the information, and ample opportunity, to mitigate or restrain it. 
 
Similarly, the TUA focuses on the tactic of picketing with the role of the picket 
supervisor, which carries a number of requirements; to be present or readily 
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contactable to attend picketing, to be identifiable, and to carry a letter of 
authorisation353, which are in addition to existing requirements of the TULRCA and 
Code of Practice on Lawful Picketing. The regulation of picketing is not new. Prior to 
the passing of the CPPA 1875354 it was considered watching and besetting,355 and 
today s220 provides immunity from liability in delict to peaceful picketing. However, 
the requirement to have a picket supervisor, who meets the additional obligations 
applies to all picketing irrespective of the peacefulness or purpose of it. Further, the 
discriminatory nature of the role – regulating only picketing by unions over trade 
disputes356  – focuses restrictions on the most immediately recognisable form of 
labour protest: the picket line. It should therefore be understood as a response to the 
ability of workers and unions to protest. If picketing is specifically different to a 
protest (as was established in Thames Cleaning Support Services v United Voices of 
the World357 – a case concerning both picketing and protest which is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter) unions may be incentivised to engage in action, such as 
protests. They may be so incentivised on the basis that the protest does not to attract 
the restrictions of picketing, and would not require a picket supervisor, far less one 
who is familiar with the Code of Practice on Picketing, contactable, and 
identifiable.358 
 
Despite their universal application, the focus of provisions, like those amending s229 
and to picketing, suggests that they are intended to restrict protest activity. They do so 
by creating substantial pre-action burdens relating to the union’s tactics, and creating 
additional obligations for lawful picketing. Those pre-action burdens have a 
disproportionate impact on sectors associated with high-profile industrial action and 
protest activity, and the picketing amendments render it much more practically 
difficult to lawfully engage in the traditional protest of picketing. Thus, the creation of 
those pre-action procedural burdens and heavy regulation of picketing makes it more 
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difficult for the union to undertake, and much easier for the employer to mitigate or 
restrain, industrial action.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
When set against the traditional Conservative perspective of trade unionism, and 
methods for reducing union’s industrial power, alongside a policy agenda of reducing 
trade union power, the underlying objective of the TUA is clear. It is inconsistent with 
the stated aims of ‘fairness’ and ‘democracy’ and designed specifically to reduce the 
capacity of organised labour to protest. It does so through provisions which 
specifically target sectors associated with high-profile industrial action, and protest 
activity. Those provisions are designed to act as a disincentive to individual 
participation and to provide employers with the opportunity to mitigate or prevent 
industrial action which features protest activity. 
 
I have argued there is an intrinsic link between the restrictiveness of the legal 
environment, and the development of leverage campaigns, whereby unions are 
incentivised to engage in tactics, like protest, which are lawful and avoid those 
restrictions. It is unsurprising, then, that one of the criticism levied against the TUA is 
that, far from ‘solving’ the perceived problems with ‘wider protests’, unions will be 
incentivised to engage in the activity, rather than traditional industrial action or 
picketing.359 Although it is rather more surprising that amongst those critics is Bruce 
Carr QC360 whose report was used to justify the TUA.  
 
The criticism, that the TUA incentivises protest, assumes that leverage campaigns, and 
protest activity, avoid the procedural requirements and practical compliance problems 
imposed by the TULRCA, as amended.361 However, as I have demonstrated the TUA 
                                                   
359 Ford, M and Novitz, T. n.13, 297-298. 
360 Carr. B n.321 
361 Ibid 
	 66	
is designed to bring protest activity within the purview of the TULRCA. In the next 
chapter, I examine the implications of the argument that unions will increasingly 
engage in protest activity, which the TUA is designed to regulate, for the lawfulness 
of industrial action and protest activity by labour. 
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4. Chapter 4. The Implications for Industrial Action  
 
 If the TUA proves to incentivise protest activity over industrial action, as has been 
predicted,362 might we expect to see an increase in employer attempts to use the law to 
prevent or mitigate the effectiveness of protest – just as interim interdicts are so often 
used to prevent or mitigate the effectiveness of industrial action?363 The amendments 
introduced by the TUA to the rules regulating pre-action ballot papers and picketing 
shift the focus of the tests of the lawfulness of industrial action from the reason for 
which it was undertaken (as is encapsulated in the so-called golden formula), towards 
what the union proposes to do and when: the tactics. How might judges faced with 
employer’s requests to restrain industrial action and protest activity interpret the 
lawfulness of industrial action and the tactic of protesting now? 
 
In this chapter, I consider the grounds on which employers may seek interim relief to 
mitigate or prevent industrial action. I do so from two potential sources of liability: 
non-compliance with the amended TULRCA, and the delict of conspiracy to injure by 
unlawful means (also referred to as unlawful means conspiracy). I argue, firstly, that 
there are provisions in the TULRCA which may be interpreted as capable of 
restraining industrial action in the case of the union’s use of protest activity; secondly, 
that the line of judicial reasoning developing in respect of delictual liability is also 
capable of restraining leverage protests. These developments significantly undermine 
the assumptions on which the lawfulness of leverage protests has been based. They 
suggest that protest activity by labour in an industrial relations context may be 
unlawful and subject to restraint, irrespective of rights conferred by Articles 10 and 11 
ECHR. 
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	 68	
4.1 Interpreting the Trade Union Act 
 
The TUA amends the TULRCA and thereby appends its requirements to the golden 
formula. As such, any failure to comply with the new rules may expose the union to 
liability in delict from which it would otherwise be ‘immune’ and provides employers 
with the opportunity to seek interim relief on the grounds that the proposed industrial 
action is unlawful. An assessment of the newly introduced requirements of the ballot 
paper364 and to the law of picketing365 indicates that they contain a number of 
interpretive problems which employers may exploit in pursuit of interim relief to 
restrain, what they would argue is, unlawful industrial action.  
 
4.1.1 Additional requirements of the Ballot Paper 
 
Under the TUA, s229 TULRCA contains three additional requirements of a lawful 
pre-action ballot paper: to provide a summary of the matter or matters at issue366, to 
specify the type or types of industrial action to be undertaken367, and to indicate the 
dates on which that action is expected to take place368. These subsections place 
substantial emphasis on the union’s intended tactics. By examining each subsection, 
and how the courts might interpret them, individually and in the context of the 
burgeoning law of industrial action, the conclusion can be drawn that it is likely that 
the amendments to s229 may be interpreted strictly to render proposed action 
unlawful, irrespective of the fact that the union’s purpose is to further a trade dispute.  
 
The statutory immunity conferred by s219 TULRCA applies only to action which is 
undertaken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute – which relates “wholly 
or mainly”369 to the one or more of the trade matters prescribed by s244(a)-(g) 
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TULRCA. The interpretive problem that the s229(2B) amendment – to require a 
summary of the matter, or matter at issue – causes may be illustrated by the concerns 
expressed by Lord Lea of Corondall and Lord Oates as the Bill was scrutinised. They 
suggested that unions may be inclined to include the “kitchen sink”370 to avoid 
inadvertently taking action over a matter not summarised on the ballot paper.371 
Alternatively, the union may not provide a sufficiently detailed summary, since the 
Act gives little guidance as to the level of detail required. In either case the content of 
that summary may render the action invalid: a summary which is too expansive may 
fall out with the categories of s244(a)-(g), or into one of the categories specifically 
excluded from protection,372 alternatively, it may indicate a political dispute.373 That 
last possibility might be particularly important given that leverage campaigns often 
have a more politicised rhetoric.374 Since the wording on a ballot paper has been found 
to be probative of a trade dispute,375 it seems likely that this subsection will be useful 
to employers. In pursuit of interim interdict, they may argue either that the summary is 
evidence that the action is not wholly or mainly connected with a trade dispute, or that 
the summary is insufficiently detailed to comply with the Act.  
 
S229 (2D), which requires that the ballot paper provides an indication as to the period, 
or periods, during which action is expected to take place, has already been the subject 
of litigation concerning the level of specificity required by the Act. In 2016 Thomas 
Cook, in Thomas Cook Airlines Ltd v British Airline Pilots Association (Thomas 
Cook)376 argued that the time periods indicated on the ballot papers failed to meet the 
specificity required by the legislation on one of two grounds. Either, the ballot paper 
was insufficiently detailed,377 or it did not reflect the very detailed and more specific, 
actual expectations of the union.378 In that case it was held that the specificity was no 
greater than the Act required – i.e. an indication, rather than specific dates, which the 
                                                   
370 Lord Lea in HL, 10/02/2016, Vol 768, col 2248 and Lord Oates in HL, Hansard 10/02/2016 Vol 
768, col 2248 
371 Ibid. That quote referred to the Bill as it was prior to an amendment changing its requirements from 
a “reasonably detailed indication” to a “summary” however a similar critique may still apply.  
372 TULRCA ss222-225 
373 Mercury Communications v Scott-Garner [1984] I.C.R 74 
374 See also Chapter One.  
375 Wandsworth LBC v NASUWT [1994] ICR 81 
376 [2017] EWHC 2253 (QB) 
377 [2017] EWHC 2253 (QB), [12] 
378 Ibid [19] 
	 70	
union had complied with.379 However, this highlights the importance of the wording 
of each subsection, and the potential of each one to require greater levels of detail, 
allowing employers to seek relief on the grounds that the union can be accused of 
failing to be sufficiently specific.  
 
Where s229(2B) required a summary, S229(2C) requires the type, or types, of action 
to be specified, and s229(2D) requires an indication as to the dates, each subsection 
therefore indicates different levels of specificity. The Thomas Cook decision suggests 
that each section might therefore be interpreted to require different degrees of 
specificity, and s229(2C) seems to attract the greatest degree of specificity.   
 
In respect of leverage protests, this is particularly important when considered 
alongside the lack of guidance as to what is meant by “type or types” of industrial 
action short of a strike. Could unions engaging in leverage protests be obliged to 
outline their plan to do so on the ballot paper under s229(2C), and if so, how might 
this give rise to liability?  
 
The requirement to distinguish between industrial action, and action short of a strike 
on a ballot paper,380 long pre-dates the TUA, which suggests that s229(2C) calls for 
something more detailed. However, where strike action, for the purposes of s229(2) is 
clearly defined in the legislation, as “any concerted stoppage of work”;381 industrial 
action short of a strike is not. S229(2A) states that for the purposes of subsection (2) – 
which outlines how the ballot question should be framed – an over-time ban and call-
out ban constitute industrial action short of a strike,382 and the explanatory notes 
similarly refer to these examples.383 Not only is it unclear whether these examples 
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would also apply to s229(2C), but they are not terms of art,384 and the legislation does 
not suggest that this an exhaustive, prescribed list. Arguably, in light of this lack of 
specificity, and in light of the policy of restricting union’s access to protest activity 
which arguably underpinned the TUA,385 s229(2C) could be interpreted as requiring 
the union to specify plans to protest, as a “type” of industrial action, on the ballot 
paper. The implication of this may be to render industrial action which includes 
protest activity unlawful. If a union engages in protest activity which is not specified 
on the ballot paper, then that ballot paper, and any subsequent industrial action, would 
be unlawful. If the union does specify the protest activity, but it takes place in manner 
which can be argued to be different to that specified on the ballot paper, the action 
could also still be unlawful, according to the level of specificity held to be required by 
the Act.  
 
Although interdicts of this kind, based on technical breaches of the TULRCA, have 
often been over-turned on appeal,386 there is a substantial body of case law which 
indicates that, at first instance, there is a willingness on the part of the courts to issue 
an interim interdict.387 It would seem likely then that these amendments could 
similarly be interpreted to give rise to interim relief for non-compliance, or 
insufficient compliance, with subsections which appear to be more concerned with the 
union’s tactics than their purpose.  
 
4.1.2  The Picket Supervisor  
 
Picketing is generally regarded as attracting a low-incidence of legal challenges.388 It 
has even been suggested that this is because the activity is so ineffective that it is 
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simply not worth the employer's resources to seek to restrain it.389 However, the 
development of leverage campaigning and the introduction, by the TUA, of the role of 
the picket supervisor,390 may reverse that trend. S10 of the TUA inserts s220A to the 
TULRCA, and as such the protections for peaceful picketing conferred by s220 do not 
apply unless the requirements of s220A(2)-(8) are complied with.391 Under s220A 
TULRCA, then, in order for peaceful picketing to be lawful, it will require to be 
supervised by the picket supervisor, who must be present, or readily contactable,392 
and identifiable.393 The additional requirements of the role include: informing the 
police of the picket supervisors name, location of the picketing, and contact 
information,394 and carrying a letter stating that the picketing is approved by the 
union.395 While the TUC was concerned that the role might give rise to liability for 
non-compliance,396 arguably even compliance with the amendments might not be 
enough to protect the picketing. When the role and responsibilities are read in 
conjunction with s20 TULRCA, concerning union vicarious liability, might it be that, 
particularly in light of the development of leverage protests, the role-holder may 
render the union liable for unlawful picketing?  
 
The legislation does not offer any guidance as to the authority or responsibilities of the 
role-holder, however, the updated Code of Practice on Picketing does give some 
indications, and one of the requirements of the role is that the individual be “familiar 
with any provisions of a code of practice issued under s203 that deal with 
picketing”.397 According to the Code of Practice on Picketing, the “other main 
functions”398 of the picket supervisor include: “ensuring pickets understand the law 
and are aware of the provisions”,399 and “controlling numbers to avoid giving rise to 
fear and resentment amongst those seeking to cross the picket line”.400  This should be 
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read in conjunction with section E subsection 55, of the Code of Practice on 
Picketing, which states that “anyone seeking to demonstrate support for those in 
dispute should keep well away from any picket line so as not to create a risk of a 
breach of the peace, and, or, other criminal acts”.401 Taken together, it appears that the 
role of the picket supervisor is to effectively police, and quash, demonstrations of 
solidarity, in the form of protests, like those common to leverage campaigns.  
 
It is important then to consider what this could mean for the union in terms of liability 
where the picket supervisor fails to adequately control the numbers which might result 
from demonstrations becoming entangled with pickets. Under s20 TULRCA unions 
may be vicariously liable for the actions of their members where the conduct is 
“authorised or endorsed”402 by any other official of the union (whether employed by it 
or not).403 It is not clear from the legislation whether the picket supervisor herself 
might be capable of ‘authorising or endorsing”, however it has been found that this 
extends to shop stewards.404  
 
That finding, in Gate Gourmet v TGWU,405 was based on the argument that “various 
union officials…have been present at the pickets, on sufficient days to mean there is a 
clear arguable case that the union…fully appreciated and understood the types of 
unlawful activity which were being routinely perpetrated…”406 The requirement that 
the picket supervisor have familiarity with the Code of Practice407 might indicate that 
the position itself is likely to be interpreted as capable of authorising or endorsing 
(according to the logic of the Gate Gourmet v TGWU408 decision). Alternatively, 
given the knowledge requirement and difficulties in finding or training volunteers,409 
it is likely that the role will be fulfilled by shop stewards, who it is already established 
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are capable of authorising or endorsing conduct, giving rise to union vicarious 
liability.410  
 
Thus, not only might the role of the picket supervisor, if not sufficiently complied 
with, give rise to liability, (as was the concern of the TUC), but even where the 
requirements of the role are met, the role-holder herself might render the union liable 
for unlawful acts. This is particularly important in light of the leverage campaign 
strategy of making use of protest activity, and the requirement of the picket supervisor 
to control numbers and keep demonstrations and picketing separate. An employer 
might argue that a demonstration or protest, taking place in close proximity to a picket 
line renders that picketing unlawful, and the liable union also liable for the 
demonstration on the grounds that the picket supervisor authorised or endorsed it. Of 
course the union could repudiate411 that it endorses the demonstration by written 
notice412 without delay413, in accordance with the provisions of s21 TULRCA. That 
subsection includes a statement warning members that “Your union has repudiated the 
call (or calls) for industrial action to which this notice relates and will give no support 
to unofficial industrial action taken in response to it (or them). If you are dismissed 
while taking unofficial industrial action, you will have no right to complain of unfair 
dismissal.”414 Even if the union could formally repudiate the action to protect itself 
from liability, s21(5) goes on to prevent the executive, president or general secretary 
from “behaving in a manner which is inconsistent with the purported repudiation”.415 
Thus if the union is to repudiate liability for acts which its shop stewards, or possibly 
picket supervisor, have authorised or endorsed – including for example 
demonstrations which become entangled with pickets – it does by exposing its 
members to the significant risk of dismissal without recourse to an unfair dismissal 
claim, and effectively quashes the solidarity being expressed. 
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The TUA provisions in s5 and s10, are clearly directed at the tactics of the union and 
the capacity of it to engage in protest activity. Further, both – particularly when read 
in conjunction with other provisions – may be interpreted to present opportunities for 
employers to seek interim interdict to prevent or restrain the activity. They should, in 
theory, then engage the protections conferred by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR.416 
However, as was suggested in chapter one, and has been argued by Ewing and Hendy, 
the industrial context of the legislation may render its provisions more vulnerable to a 
judicial interpretation that the measures fall within the margin of appreciation.417  
 
4.2 The Development of an Anti-Leverage Interdict 
 
 
 
Part of the strategy underpinning leverage campaigns is the use of protest activity 
directed at third parties, as it is assumed that these activities are prima facie lawful, for 
not involving the commission of any delicts, and involve the exercise of rights which 
are protected by the ECHR. However, some recent litigation concerning protests 
directed at third parties indicates that the courts are developing a line of reasoning 
which significantly undermines these assumptions. Having set out the facts of two 
such cases, and their relevance to a comparison with leverage campaigns, I consider 
the reasoning of the judges. I argue that the judicial interpretation of such protest 
activity, as giving rise to liability in the delict of unlawful means conspiracy, amounts 
to the development of an anti-leverage interdict.  
 
4.2.1 Thames Cleaning and Support Services Ltd v United Voices of the World 
[2016] EWHC 1310 (QB) (Thames Cleaning) 
 
Having undertaken a cleaning contract in 2011 at Wood Street, Thames Cleaning and 
Support Services Ltd (Thames Cleaning) sought to make changes to working 
                                                   
416 Ewing, K.D. and Hendy, J QC. (2016). The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Failure of Human 
Rights. Industrial Law Journal. 45 (3), 421. 
417 Ibid. 
	 76	
practices, which involved redundancies. By the time the industrial action was 
proposed, the dispute had developed into one of redundancies, wages, and union 
recognition.418 The union balloted and notified the employer of the ballot under s226A 
TULRCA. 
 
That notification, which included corporate tenants of Wood Street, advised that “we 
will also be engaging in regular, disruptive and high profile direct actions at 100 
Wood Street, in order to raise awareness amongst the many companies that have 
offices at 100 Wood Street, about Thames Cleaning’s unfair, unnecessary and 
unlawful dismissal of over half the cleaners at 100 Wood Street.”419 The email 
notification also included links to YouTube videos of previous demonstrations to 
show “some of our recent demonstrations against unfair redundancies, trade union 
victimisation and refusal to pay a living wage, amongst other things.”420 Thus, the 
union proposed to use high-profile protest activity, directed at the customers of the 
employer, which resembles the kind of leverage activity to which the Trade Union Act 
was presented as responding, although the activity in question pre-dates the TUA.    
 
Justice Warby refused to continue the interdict initially granted as he described it as an 
“anti-picketing”421 interdict which was “inapt” to restrain the behaviour actually 
complained of.422 Thames Cleaning is therefore one of few attempts by the courts to 
differentiate the treatment of picketers from that of protestors. However, as is 
discussed in more detail in the next section, it is also an important case because of 
Justice Warby’s reasoning. On evidence of the union’s notification, he restrained the 
protests and asserted that he did so without infringing upon Convention rights. 
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This case pre-dates the introduction of the TUA, however, an important consideration 
here is the union’s “over-notification”.423 At the time, the union was not obliged to 
notify the employer of its intended protest activity. However, in light of s299(2C), 
unions could be required to notify of this activity. Not only is it unclear whether 
s229(2C) requires notification of protest, but – if it does – the nature of that 
notification is also unclear. At what point would a union’s statutory obligation to 
notify conflict with this reasoning whereby the nature of that notification is considered 
to threaten, and particularly where it is considered evidence of liability in delict.  
 
4.2.2 Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 2945 (Ch) (Ineos) 
 
This case does not concern an industrial dispute, or a protest in furtherance of one, but 
was brought by claimants, including Ineos and a number of their suppliers and 
contractors in the fracking industry.424 They sought to restrain protest activity at a 
number of Sites on the grounds, inter alia, that the anti-fracking protestors had, in the 
past, committed criminal acts and that such acts could give rise to, among other 
things, delictual liability for conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.425  The principal 
similarity between these protests and with leverage campaigns lies in the targeting of 
suppliers through the use of high-profile protest activity. According to Justice 
Morgan, there were two categories of targets of the protests – asserted by the 
Claimants to be unlawful.  Firstly, Ineos Upstream Ltd (Ineos) as an operator in the 
shale gas industry to which the protestors objected was targeted.426 Secondly, 
“companies which form part of the supply chain to the operators [in this case Ineos] 
who carry on shale gas exploration”427 were the direct targets of the protest activity, 
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with the object of causing “those [supply chain] companies to withdraw from 
supplying shale gas operators”.428 
 
In considering the likely outcome at trial, the judge dealt quite briefly with the 
conspiracy to injure. He found “clear evidence”429 of a combination of unlawful acts – 
namely theft and criminal damage, contravention of s137 of the Highways Act, and 
contravention of s22A of the Road Traffic Act. He further found that the protestors 
intended to injure the fracking operator as the protests took place in relation to the 
premises and vehicles of the operator or of the third-party contractors.430 He argued 
that the location and duration of the protests was intended to be long enough to have 
an adverse impact on the activities of the fracking companies.431 On that basis, he 
issued a long-term continuation of interim-interdicts,432 again, the judge asserted that 
he did so without infringing upon Convention rights.  
 
4.2.3 Judicial Reasoning and Discussion 
 
In both cases, interim interdicts were issued on the basis that a trial court was “more 
likely than not”433 to find that the activities might give rise to delictual liability for 
conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, and so should, in the interim, be restrained. 
Justice Morgan, in the Ineos case, outlined the features of the delict as: a combination, 
to use unlawful means (which may be criminal or delictual),434 with the intention to 
injure the claimant and cause them loss.435 In Thames Cleaning, the union’s 
representative was “constrained to accept that if, in order to put pressure on the 
claimant to concede their demands, the union and Mr Elia were to whip up large 
numbers of third parties to attend at, or near, Wood Street, with the aim of physically 
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preventing people from getting to work there, or so harassing or intimidating them as 
to scare them away, they might be liable to be sued for unlawful means 
conspiracy”.436 Justice Warby, went on to issue an interim interdict which amounted 
to the imposition of a geographical exclusion zone, within which protest (not 
picketing) would be unlawful.437 Similarly, in Ineos, unlawful means conspiracy was a 
specific head of claim and Justice Morgan issued, and continued, a number of interim 
interdicts, of which two are of particular note. One was to restrain trespass (by 
preventing accessing or remaining on specific land) at some sites. Another, in what 
has been described as a “supply chain injunction”,438 was to “restrain a combination, 
with the intent of causing injury to Ineos, where the combination is to commit any of 
the modes of obstructing access to the highway or use of the highway [which he had 
referred to in an earlier part of the judgement] … the access and use in question being 
by a third party contractor engaged to supply goods or services to Ineos...”439 The 
imposition of these interdicts, clearly intended to restrain the protest activity which 
was directed at third parties, effectively suggests that the requisite unlawful means and 
intent to injure are found in that protest activity.  
 
By reviewing how the UK judges, in these cases, interpreted the protest activity as 
giving rise to liability in that delict, and comparing their reasoning with that of judges 
in the US adjudicating over similar litigation, it is possible to demonstrate how the law 
in the UK is developing an anti-leverage interdict. 
 
A key feature in the reasoning of the judges was the characterisation of the protests, 
directed at third parties, as disruptive direct action. For example, Justice Warby’s 
refusal to grant the “anti-picketing” interdict, and decision to grant the interim 
geographical exclusion zone, turned on his interpretation of the union’s conduct, 
directed at third parties. He reasoned that what the union had threatened in its 
notification of an intention to take “regular disruptive high profile direct actions”440 
                                                   
436  [2016] EWHC 1310 (QB), [45] 
437 Ibid [54] 
438 https://www.falcon-chambers.com/news/ineos-upstream-ltd-ors-v-persons-unknown-2017-ewhc-
2945-ch (Last Accessed 20/09/2019) 
439 [2017] EWHC 2945 (Ch), [114], [150]-[151] 
440 [2016] EWHC 1310 (QB), [13], and [43] 
	 80	
was not picketing but “noisy, intimidating, mass protests, at or near Wood Street, by 
people who had no pre-existing connection with the workers who might be on strike, 
with the objective of harassing the claimant and embarrassing it into conceding the 
union’s demands”.441 This, he reasoned, “went beyond the limits of lawful protest”442 
because of the physical confrontation at close quarters between the protestors and 
“those seeking to go about their lawful daily activities”.443 In a similar argument 
Justice Morgan stated that the protestors were “doing much more than expressing their 
opinion…they [were] taking direct action against fracking companies to stop their 
fracking activities”.444 This interpretation implies that these protests – characterised as 
‘direct action’ for their disruption being directed at third parties – go beyond typical 
lawful protest, and are intended to injure. In this there are some stark similarities with 
the definitions of ‘leverage campaigning’ offered in the Carr Review. Those 
definitions had in common an assumption that leverage, or extreme conduct, involved 
the direction of intimidation, disruption and humiliation at third parties – such as 
suppliers, customers, shareholders and senior management, to gain concessions.445 In 
the Carr Review the capacity of labour to use these tactics was presented as a gap in 
the legal framework.446  
 
 Arguably the reasoning of Justices Warby and Morgan, in finding that the protests 
might give rise to delictual liability, fills that gap. Justice Warby, rejected the union’s 
argument that the “real purpose [of the claimant’s request for a geographical exclusion 
zone] was to spare themselves embarrassment amongst their contractual partners,”447 
instead suggesting that this, evidenced by their conduct, might give rise to liability in 
unlawful means conspiracy. As was acknowledged in both cases the fact that the 
activities were directed at third parties would not preclude the claimants from 
succeeding in a claim in unlawful means conspiracy. Indeed, they acknowledged that 
the delict is advantageous to the claimants,448 and to employers who are the target of 
protests directed at their suppliers, because, in order to establish liability in unlawful 
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means conspiracy, it is sufficient that the claimants were the intended, victims even 
where acts were directed at third parties. In other words it was sufficient that the 
claimants were the intended (indirect) victims of the unlawful means.449 It therefore 
appears that by directing activities at third parties this is further evidence of the 
disruptiveness of the protests, and implies that the union might be liable in unlawful 
means conspiracy.  
 
‘Direct action’, ‘protest’, and ‘demonstration’, much like ‘leverage’ or ‘extreme 
conduct”, are hazy terms450, which are not clearly defined in law.451 However, Justices 
Warby and Morgan have attributed to them quite distinct definitions.  Protest 
apparently concerns the expression of opinion, whereas ‘direct action’ involves the 
use of disruptive conduct. This then allowed the judges to suggest that the activities of 
the union (in Thames Cleaning) and the ‘persons unknown’ (in Ineos) went “beyond 
lawful protest”,452 and that a trial court would “more likely than not”453 find a real and 
imminent risk of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.454 Consequently, interim 
interdicts were framed to restrain that conduct which, the Judges asserted, do so 
without infringing upon the Convention rights. 
 
 In Thames Cleaning, Justice Warby asserted that the geographical exclusion zone 
would “set clear boundaries, without destroying the essence of the right to protest, 
which does not depend on location, and without interfering disproportionately with 
Article 10 and Article 11 rights”.455 In a similar argument Justice Morgan was quite 
explicit in stating that “the location of the direct action is chosen as the best place to 
interfere with the activities of the fracking operators rather than (as in Parliament 
Square or St Paul's Churchyard) the best place to express opinions to the general 
public”.456  He further considered that “ it is not open to the Defendants to rely on 
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Articles 10 and 11 in an attempt to justify direct action for the purpose of harming the 
Claimants with a view to forcing them to give up their lawful business…”457 Thus, by 
characterising the activities at issue not as protests – which would be protected by 
Article 10 and Article 11 ECHR – but as unprotected ‘direct action’, the judges in 
these cases have drawn an artificial and disingenuous distinction between ‘protests’ 
and ‘direct action’ with the far-reaching consequence that Articles 10 and 11 are not 
engaged, leaving the participants unprotected.   
 
The extent to which that distinction is disingenuous is perhaps best illustrated by 
briefly returning to the US jurisprudence emerging from s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) NLRA, to 
compare the judicial reasoning in the UK with that of US judges adjudicating over 
similar litigation. In the US, s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) NLRA prohibits inciting a secondary 
boycott, as it renders it an unfair labour practice to “threaten, coerce or restrain any 
person engaged in commerce, or in an industry affecting commerce, where the object 
is forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or 
otherwise, dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, 
or to cease doing business with any other person”.458 This prohibition of inciting a 
secondary boycott is effectively a statutory equivalent of the interpretation of the 
delict of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means offered by Justices Warby and 
Morgan above: it has the same effect, of rendering actions directed at third parties in 
disputes unlawful. 
 
The proper course of analysis for US courts presented with the argument that an 
activity violates s8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is to ask firstly, does the activity violate the terms of 
the legislation –does it “threaten, coerce or restrain” and secondly, does it constitute 
picketing?459 The courts are also required to interpret statutory provisions in such as a 
way to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional.460 Thus, two related tests have 
developed: The Speech Plus Doctrine,461 and the Picketing Test.462 According to the 
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Speech Plus Doctrine, the First Amendment will only protect speech, and not conduct. 
According to the Picketing Test, if an activity constitutes picketing it involves 
coercive conduct which is not protected by the First Amendment. By either test, a 
finding of ‘more than mere communication’,463 or a mixture of communication and 
conduct”464 is fatal to First Amendment protection, and leaves activity directed at third 
parties vulnerable to liability under s8(b)(4)(ii)(B).  
 
As was discussed in chapter one, the modus operandi of leverage appears to have been 
developed with an eye to comprehensive campaigns in the US. The application of 
these tests to tactics of comprehensive campaigns, in part to avoid rendering the 
statute unconstitutional, has often involved likening the activities to speech, or protest 
activity, as opposed to picketing. Recently, in Sheet Metal Workers Local # 15 
(Brandon Regional Hospital),465 following decisions like DeBartolo II466 that 
handbilling is protected speech, the D.C Appeal Court disagreed with the Board’s 
initial analysis that the mock funeral (described as street theatre), violated 
s8(b)(4)(ii)(B).467 In doing-so the Court likened the street theatre to protest activity at 
abortion clinics, which had been found to be constitutionally protected.468 The court 
argued that whilst the ends of the secondary boycott may have had the “functional 
equivalent of picketing”,469 the means by which it was achieved (the mock funeral) 
lacked the “coercive character of picketing”.470 The Court reversed the ruling on the 
mock funeral and remanded the case back to the Board to consider whether the 
inflatable rat, handbilling, or banners would amount to violations. In the meantime in 
Eliason 355 NLRB No. 159 (Eliason),471 the Board, had found that the display of a 
large inflatable rat balloon lacked coercive conduct to violate s8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and 
amounted to symbolic, protected speech.472 Thus, the Board found that the inflatable 
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rat and handbilling at issue in Brandon Regional Hospital473 also did not violate the 
Act as they were neither picketing nor coercive,474 and found that they were 
“expressive activities”475 protected by the First Amendment, so not reached by 
s8(b)(4)(ii)(B).   
 
Although this is far from settled law – with cases continuing to arise and be decided in 
different ways at different levels476 – in the US, when faced with the prospect of ruling 
that certain types of protest activity are unlawful, the Courts have tended to liken 
those activities to speech. Doing so allowed the Courts to find that they were protected 
by the First Amendment, and out with the reach of s8(b)(4)(ii)(B). In other words, the 
activities could not be restrained, as to do so would infringe upon First Amendment 
rights. 
 
Despite engaging in a very similar analysis of protest activity – drawing distinctions 
between protests, or speech involving the expression of opinion, and those which are 
viewed as involving disruptive, or coercive, conduct – the two jurisdictions have 
reached very different conclusions. Where in the US that analysis allowed the activity 
to be likened to protest activity, and so protected by the First Amendment, by 
comparison in the UK the reasoning appears to have been developed to avoid the 
protections of the ECHR. By characterising the activity as disruptive direct action, 
going beyond typical protest and not therefore protected by the Convention rights, the 
judges reasoned that they could issue interim interdicts without infringing upon 
Convention rights – even without any unlawful acts actually having taken place. The 
argument that these protests are qualitatively different from typical protests is 
disingenuous: it unquestioningly assumes that all protest activity which is directed at 
third parties (other than severely restricted picketing in Thames Cleaning) may be 
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unlawful – which is reinforced by the terms of the interdicts issued. Even where, as is 
the case with leverage campaigns the purpose is to further a trade dispute by 
publicising its existence and thereby put at stake the employer’s reputation.  
 
This judicial reasoning marks an important reassertion of the law of delict into the law 
of industrial action, rendering activities, particularly protests directed at third parties, 
associated with leverage campaigning unlawful. The requisite unlawfulness is 
established by a finding of disruptive ‘direct action’ – as distinct from protest. This 
distinction resembles the US distinction between speech and conduct. However, if the 
US experience – of finding that protest tactics e.g. use of handbills, banners, street 
theatre and inflatable rats are protected speech by the First Amendment – teaches us 
anything, it is that the leverage protests should similarly be treated as protest activity, 
protected by the Convention rights, and not restrained. However, in the UK, there is 
evidence of the development of an anti-leverage interdict which is based on the 
judicial assumption that protest activities directed a third parties are unlawful. Further, 
there is evidence of both a willingness to restrain the activity, and a real reticence to 
protect it. Just as the Court, in Brandon Regional Medical Centre477 in the US, 
accused the Board of failing to differentiate between the means and ends, a similar 
criticism could be levied at the UK courts. The employer may well be the intended 
(indirect) target of the activity, however, the means – of directing protests at third 
parties – are not unlawful, but ‘jealously protected’ Convention rights.478 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
Traditionally, the legal framework regulating industrial action in this country 
distinguished lawful from unlawful action with reference to the trade union’s purpose. 
According to the golden formula, a trade union would be immune from suit in delict if 
it had acted ‘in contemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute.  In 1980, Lord 
Scarman counted himself and his colleagues on the bench lucky to be spared the 
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‘strange and embarrassing task’ of assessing the nature of the tactics used by trade 
unions in the course of an industrial dispute in order to determine the lawfulness of 
their actions.479 As a result of the amendments to the law contained in the TUA, and of 
union and employer responses to those amendments, it seems that judges will 
increasingly be called upon to do just that. 
 
The comparison drawn in chapter one between the development of leverage in the UK 
and comprehensive campaigns in the US suggested that union and worker engagement 
in public protest can be incentivised where the right to take industrial action is 
continually subjected to increasingly narrowed restrictions. The TUA creates a 
number of additional restrictions on the right to take industrial action and therefore 
further incentivises protest activity as an ‘easy’, effective and, assumed lawful, 
alternative. It seems equally likely then that employers will respond with the 
“powerful industrial weapon”480 of interim interdict, turning to the courts to prevent, 
or restrain leverage. Contrary to assumptions about the prima facie lawfulness of 
protest activity, the amended TULRCA and the common law both present 
opportunities for litigation arguing that the union’s industrial action is unlawful. 
Through the delict of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, and by differentiating 
between ‘protest’, and ‘direct action’, the courts are able to restrain the activity, whilst 
claiming not to infringe on the Convention Rights. This is indicative of a judiciary 
which is willing to restrain protest activity – a willingness which is likely to carry into 
their interpretation of the TUA. However, it also affords employers an opportunity to 
restrain leverage protest activity under the common law, irrespective of the amended 
TULRCA. Thus, there is a significantly increased opportunity for, and likelihood of, 
protest activity and industrial action being restrained by the courts on the basis of their 
tactics.   
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480 G Gall. n.220, 327-349. 
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5. General Conclusions  
 
In 2013 Unite the Union was accused of using ‘leverage’ tactics in an industrial 
dispute with Ineos at the petrochemical refinery in Grangemouth.481 There, the union 
engaged in tactics which, amongst others, included high-profile protest activity. It was 
that activity which attracted the attention of the mainstream media and of the 
Government, initially in the commissioning of the Carr Review and later in the Trade 
Union Act 2016, which was arguably designed to render the kinds of activity 
associated with Grangemouth unlawful. The aim of this thesis has been to assess that 
legislation, as a response to leverage campaigning, asking firstly if and how it can be 
understood as a response to leverage, and secondly what are its implications for 
determining the lawfulness of industrial action. It is concluded that the TUA can, and 
indeed should, be understood from the perspective that it forms a response to leverage 
campaigning, and that it leaves unions increasingly vulnerable to litigation, with 
employers arguing that the protests in furtherance of a trade dispute are unlawful.  
 
Reaching that conclusion required an understanding of what is meant by ‘leverage’, 
and why it developed, beyond the descriptions offered in the press following 
Grangemouth, and in the Carr Review. By comparing the UK leverage campaigns 
with the US experience of comprehensive campaigns it is clear that leverage is not 
simply the use of protest during industrial disputes but has a strategic underpinning 
which intrinsically links its development with the legal framework. The comparison 
drawn in chapter one demonstrates that while the use of protest is a key feature of the 
leverage campaign, the strategy of leverage is to develop tactics – like protests – 
which publicise the dispute to influential parties, which are lawful, and which do not 
derive that lawfulness from compliance with the restrictive law governing industrial 
action. In the minds of trade unionists like McCluskey, in other words, leverage is a 
symptom of an increasingly restrictive framework and ought not to be the cause of 
one. 
 
                                                   
481 Dixon, H. n.1 
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However, this is precisely what happened when the Government sought to introduce 
legislation which would bring the activity of protesting during industrial disputes 
within the ambit of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.  
 
Analysis of the Government’s policy pronouncements in the wake of the 
Grangemouth dispute, the Carr Review (as it was commissioned, its content, and its 
findings), and the views of the Government espoused during the Consultation process, 
demonstrate quite deliberate efforts at developing a narrative to justify and legitimise 
legislative intervention to restrict the use of protest activity in industrial disputes. That 
narrative created a nexus between ‘leverage’, presented as protest activity during 
industrial disputes, and extreme conduct. Accordingly, the ability of labour to lawfully 
engage in that ‘extreme’ conduct was presented as a gap in the law of industrial 
action. Thus, the Government was able to justify legislative measures which would 
restrict labour’s access to protest activity – or what Carr called ‘protests in furtherance 
of a trade dispute’,482 and the Government described as ‘wider protests’483– on the 
grounds that the industrial context rendered it inherently extreme.  
 
Assessment of the enacted provisions of the TUA similarly demonstrates that they are 
pursuant to a policy of restricting the capacity of labour to protest. Enacted provisions, 
such as balloting thresholds,484 the obligation to specify tactics on the ballot paper,485 
and the introduction of the picket supervisor, do not prima facie regulate the use of 
‘wider protests’. However, by tracing their development – from manifesto pledges and 
Consultation proposals to enacted legislation – and against the background of the 
narrative surrounding union’s protest activity, it is possible to identify their underlying 
objective. That objective may be summarised as restricting union’s access to protest 
activity by, in a manner reminiscent of the 1980’s, making their lawful use of protests 
subject to the onerous requirements of the TULRCA, and thereby creating 
opportunities for employers to seek to have the activity restrained. This point is 
reinforced by making a tentative prediction as to the judicial interpretation of the 
                                                   
482 The Carr Review (October 2014) n.4 [5.77] 
483 BIS Consultation on Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers (July 2015) n.232 [5]  
484 TUA s2 and 3 
485 TUA s229 
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provisions of the TUA. The TUA may be understood as a response to leverage in its 
determination to bring the use of protest activity, by unions in industrial disputes, 
within the confines of the TULRCA, thereby undermining the assumptions of 
lawfulness upon which the leverage strategy is based. 
 
It follows, then, that the purpose of furthering a trade dispute is sufficient to render the 
protests in industrial disputes unlawful. This is evident in a review of the likely 
judicial treatment of both the legislation and protest activity. By reviewing litigation 
concerning protest activity, which might resemble leverage activity, and by comparing 
it with the US experience, the thesis identifies a significant deficit in the law. That 
deficit is not, as Carr and the Government suggested, the ability of labour to protest 
lawfully, but rather the reticence of the judiciary to protect the unions’ right to protest. 
Comparison with the US also identifies a means of interpreting activities as speech (or 
protest as the UK judiciary have referred to it), not conduct (referred to in the UK as 
direct action), and therefore protected under the First Amendment. However, despite 
engaging in a similar analysis in the UK the distinction has allowed the judiciary to 
avoid protecting the protest activity. Not only does this not bode well for any future 
judicial interpretation of the TUA, but it is also indicative of a judiciary which has 
similarly connected ‘leverage’ protest – as protests directed at third parties – with 
extreme conduct which is capable of giving rise to liability in unlawful means 
conspiracy. Thus, either under the TUA or the common law employers seeking to 
restrain the protest as unlawful conduct will force the judiciary to engage in the 
“strange and embarrassing task”486 of interpreting the tactics of unions to determine 
the lawfulness of industrial action.  
 
In answer to Len McCluskey’s question ‘can unions remain within the law any 
longer?’487 unions engaging in leverage campaigns which include protests, on the 
basis that they are lawful and out with the scope of the TULRCA, should exercise 
caution as the activity is increasingly likely to be found to be unlawful. The fact that a 
protest is undertaken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute is increasingly 
                                                   
486 [1979] ICR 210 
487 McCluskey, L. n.5, 439-449 
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likely to cause it to be unlawful: either by virtue of the provisions of the TUA, or 
under the common law. Historically the golden formula delineated the lawfulness of 
industrial action by reference to that purpose of furthering a trade dispute. However, 
by regulating protest activity in response to the development of leverage campaigning 
and bringing it within the restrictions of the TULRCA, the TUA restricts unions’ right 
to protest thereby rendering the golden formula simultaneously the gateway to 
statutory immunity488 and the barrier to lawful protest. This makes it increasingly 
difficult for unions to lawfully express dissent or exercise industrial power through 
leverage campaigns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
488 Simpson, B.  n.105, 475 
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